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RELEVANCY IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
by Lester B. Orfield*
It is an easy matter to state that evidence must be relevant.
And it is easy to define relevancy in terms such as 'prove or dis-
prove," "probable inference," "logical as well as legal," and "point-
ing with compelling force." But the application of a test or test
for relevant evidence is not a matter of definition and black letter
law. When dealing with rules of evidence it is undeniable that
"each case turns on its own facts."
This article is devoted to an analysis of relevant evidence in
federal criminal cases. As the number of cited cases will indicate,
this has been a Herculean task. Yet the result hoped for is more
than a compilation; but if no more results than this, the prac-
titioner will have at his disposal the facilities to provide the
ultimate analysis.
I. IN GENERAL-THE TEST OF RELEVANCY
"The rule is universal in criminal trials that no evidence shall
be introduced that 'does not directly tend to the proof or disproof
of the matter in issue.' "1 The Supreme Court has taken the posi-
tion that evidence rules for criminal trials have the narrow effect
of confining the trial contest to evidence which is "strictly relevant
to the particular offense charged."12 Relevancy is tested on the
basis of "whether the conclusion sought to be established is a
*Professor of Law, Indiana University; member United States Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1941-1946;
Consultant, American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence, 1939-1942;
author of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL (1947) and CRIMINAL
APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939).
'Bowman v. United States, 267 Fed. 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1920). See-also
Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 356, 360 (1901). See generally 1 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2, 9-12, 25-36, 38-43, 52-81, 165a, 191-213 (3d ed.
1940); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 301-04, 321, 445-60 (3d ed. 1940); 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 925, 998-99 (3d ed. 1940); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1608-21 (3d ed.. 1940); 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1980-86 (3d ed. 1940);
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 314-83 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 183-214 (1961); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 281-567 (12th
ed. 1955); 1 JONES, EVIDENCE 268-360 (5th ed. 1958); 1 UNDERHILL,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 6, 11, 15-19, 190-212, 265 (5th ed. 1956).
2 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
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probable inference from the offered fact."'3 In a case involving
circumstantial evidence, Circuit Judge Hutcheson stated: "One
of the prime rules in the trial of criminal cases is that circumstances,
when relevant and cogent, may constitute evidence of guilt, but
they must have a legal, as well as logical, relevancy, and they must
have probative force, that is they must point with compelling force
to the fact to be proven."'4 On the other hand, a leading writer
would discard the term "legal relevancy" altogether in order to
make for clearer thinking."5 Examples of relevancy (or irrele-
vancy) abound. Where a letter is introduced for the sole purpose
of comparison of handwriting, evidence as to the causes for writing
the letter is irrelevant. 6 It is error to allow the prosecution to
question defendant's counsel and a government witness regarding
the signing of a statement in the counsel's office after the defend-
ant's arrest, where the defendant was not present at the signing.7 In
the first place the defendant took no part in the transaction, and
second,,the inference might arise that defendant's counsel had en-
deavored to tamper with the prosecution's witness. In the prosecu-
tion of a physician for illegal sale of drugs, the testimony of a
narcotics agent that the defendant's office was a mecca for badly
emaciated, nervous and fidgety patients was held to be irrelevant
and prejudicial.8 In a prosecution for violation of a cabaret tax
statute, the court properly excluded the defendant's evidence as to
examination by the government of the defendant's income tax
liability, as this was a collateral matter having no relevancy.9
3 Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See Mc-
CORIuICK, EVIDENCE 317-19 (1954).
On the meaning of relevancy see generally 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE§§ 2, 9-12, 25-36, 38-43 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 314-21
(1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 183-96 (1961); 1 WHARTON,
CRnIAL EVIDENCE 281-312 (12th ed. 1955); 1 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE §§ 6, 11, 15-19, 265 (5th ed. 1956); 1 JONES, EVIDENCE 268-82(5th ed. 1958); James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF.
L. REV. 689 (1941); THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE OF EVIDENCE
263-76, 515-18 (1898); Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 1
(1956); 6 KAN. L. REV. 39 (1957); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy
-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952); Ladd, Determina-
tion of Relevancy, 31 TuL. L. REV. 81 (1956).
4 Kassin v. United States, 87 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1937).
5 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 152, at 320-21 (1954). See Trautman, Logical
or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952).
6 Fasulo v. United States, 7 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1925).
7 lrving v. United States, 53 F.2d 55, 57-58 (9th Cir. 1931).
8 Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624, 631-32 (8th Cir. 1941).
9United States v. Franklin, 170 F. Supp. 503, 506 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
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In a prosecution for mailing obscene matter, the trial judge may
properly exclude books and magazines regularly sold in commerce
containing nudes because the evidence has no potential probative
weight on the issues under trial. °
In the early case of United States v. Dowden, it was held that
the defendant has the right to introduce evidence indicating the
spirit and temper with which the prosecution has been conducted."
For example, he may show that the government has tampered
with witnesses who testified against the defendant at the pre-
liminary examination. United States v. Lennon held that on the
record presented, an attempt to insinuate politics into a prosecution
of a Congressman's secretary for income tax evasion, was not
reversible error. 2
In a prosecution for possession of an unregistered distillery
and fermenting mash, testimony that, when apprehended, defendant
was carrying 1,242 dollars in cash and a check for 245 dollars had
probative value in corroborating the defendant's role in the illegal
enterprise, and it could be admitted to corroborate a confession.
3
INTENT
For purposes of showing intent the government was allowed
to introduce statements of prostitutes showing the defendant's
intimate familiarity with prostitution in a prosecution for violation
of the Mann Act.14 Where evidence of Communist Party activities
is relevant, it is admissible even though it tends to provoke present-
day juries towards prejudice.15 In a prosecution for income tax
evasion, evidence of the defendant's transactions with others was
held admissible. The court stated: "We believe these offers of
evidence were relevant to the defendant's contentions that his
omission of sales receipts was not wilful."'16
REMOTENESS
Remoteness is largely a matter of discretion of the trial judge.
The judge may exclude evidence of facts which, though relevant
10 Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"125 Fed. Cas. 905, 906 (No. 14990a) (Crim. Ct. D.C. 1843).
12 246 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957).
13 Hagan v. United States, 245 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1957). The court
cited McCormick, Evidence §§ 151-52 (1954).
14 Holder v. United States, 271 F.2d 214, 217 (8th Cir. 1959).
15 Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928, 939 (10th Cir. 1959).
16 Watkins v. United States, 287 F.2d 932, 934 (ist Cir. 1961). The court
cited 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 34-36 (3d ed. 1940).
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to the issue, appear to him to be too remote to be material under
all the circumstances of the case.17 Remoteness may be a bar to
evidence of other offenses in case of a declaration against interest. 8
With respect to evidence of other offenses to show intent or motive
the trial court has much discretion as to remoteness in time.19 In
trial of a defendant for conspiracy to oppose the draft law by force,
admission of a highly seditious and disloyal speech by a third
person not shown to be connected with the defendant is reversible
error.20 In cases where there are witnesses to the happening of
an event and the sole question is whether or not the event hap-
pened, it is not proper to permit the introduction of other remote
matters to prove intent where intent is not involved.21
Where an indictment in setting forth a scheme to defraud by
the use of the mails charged that stock of a corporation sold pur-
suant to the scheme was of little or no value, and also charged a con-
spiracy from June 27, 1921 to October 12, 1922, the testimony of a
trustee in bankruptcy, who took over the assets in October, 1922,
as to what the assets then were, was not too remote, as it was during
the continuance of the conspiracy.22
The probative remoteness of testimony is never alone an ab-
solute reason for its exclusion.2 3 The objection should be ac-
companied by some other objection such as the confusion it may
cause or the emotions it may arouse to disturb impartial decision.
Nevertheless, "the trial judge possesses wide latitude in the de-
termination of the relevancy or materiality of evidence and his
ruling cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. " 24
"[R]ulings will be sustained, if the testimony, which is admitted
tends even remotely to establish the ultimate fact."25
17Johnson v. United States, 170 Fed. 581, 582 (Ist Cir. 1909) (evidence
admitted).
18 United States v. Mulholland, 50 Fed. 413, 415 (D. Ky. 1892). But see
United States v. Bucur, 194 F.2d 297, 304 (7th Cir. 1952).
19Kettenbach v. United States, 202 Fed. 377, 383-84 (9th Cir. 1913), cert.
denied, 229 U.S. 613 (1913).
2o Enfield v. United States, 261 Fed. 141, 143 (8th Cir. 1919).
2 1Holzmacher v. United States, 266 Fed. 979 (7th Cir. 1920).
22 Tank v. United States, 8 F.2d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 1925).
2 3 United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1947); United States
v. Thompson, 117 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
24Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312, 325 (9th Cir. 1957).
25Louie v. United States, 218 Fed. 36, 41 (9th Cir. 1914).
RELEVANCY IN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
HARMLESS ERROR
Admission of irrelevant evidence not objected to may con-
stitute harmless error. In a prosecution for conspiracy to blow up
a railroad track, and for actually blowing up track, testimony of a
witness that one of the alleged accomplices gave the witness dyna-
mite more than a week after the offense was irrelevant, but since
not seasonably objected to it was harmless error under Rule 52 (a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.26
Judge Learned Hand has concluded that "when evidence has
any substantial logical bearing on the issue, it is best to admit it,
unless it interjects other and disturbing issues into the trial.' 27
In holding that there was no reversible error in permitting a gov-
ernment witness to give, on cross-examination, testimony as to the
defendant's arrest "for policy" some fifteen years earlier, it was
stated by Judge Charles E. Clark: 28
It is now common place that the rules of evidence have tended ever
more freely in the direction of admission of all relevant testimony
in the light of modern experience that the truth is more often found
by full revelation than by concealment. Hence we have a modern
principle, stated in the Model Code of Evidence, and now embodied
in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 7: 'General Abolition of
...Exclusionary Rules.! Except as otherwise provided in these
Rules . . . (f) all relevant evidence is admissible. And we have
often admonished our trial judges to err, if at all, on the side
of the admission, rather than the exclusion, of evidence. A trialjudge must rule on admissibility quickly and almost by instinct;
his instinct ought to be to bring out the truth, rather than to
permit a party to cover up a part of his case.
However, evidence not relevant to the defendant's defense of-
fered at the trial does not become relevant when the defendant on
appeal raises a defense which he failed to raise at the trial.2 9
When an item of evidence is offered and judged in isolation,
of course it cannot be expected to furnish conclusive proof of the
ultimate fact to be inferred.30 In a prosecution for possession of
unstamped distilled spirits, the court, in passing on the relevancy
26Horton v. United States, 256 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1958).
2 7United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948). See also
United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1947); 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 10 (3d ed. 1940).
28 United States v. Apuzzo, 245 F.2d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1957). This case was
followed in United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp 644, 646 (S.D. N.Y.
1958), citing McComcK, EVIDENCE at xi (1954).
29Williamson v. United States, 262 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1959).
3 0McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE § 152, at 317 (1954).
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of evidence that the defendant had at an earlier time had such
unstamped spirits in the same place, stated: 1
Its relevancy did not, and indeed could not, demand that it be
conclusive; most convictions result from the cumulation of bits of
proof which, taken singly, would not be enough in the mind of a
fair minded person. All that is necessary, and all that is possible,
is that each bit may have enough rational connection with the
issue to be considered a factor contributing to an answer.
The Supreme Court has stated that "an offer of proof cannot be
denied as remote or speculative because it does not cover every
fact necessary to prove the issue. If it be an appropriate link in
the chain of proof, that is enough.
'32
The rules of evidence are framed on the bases of the practical
necessities of legal controversy.33 Justice Cardozo pointed out: 34
It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules
of evidence are framed. They have their source very often in con-
siderations of administrative convenience, of practical expediency,
and not in rules of logic. When the risk of confusion is so great as
to upset the balance of advantage the evidence goes out.
WEIGHT OF PROOF
Relevancy should be distinguished from weight of proof.35 In
Morton v. United States,36 the court stated: "Appellant's objections
to evidence concerning interest and bias of witnesses, blood tests,
soil tests, whiskey bottles, photographs of the park table under
which Mrs. Groome's body was found, and the newspaper con-
taining a report of the crime which was found in appellant's room
are applicable to the weight of the evidence in each case not to
its admissibility."
31 United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1945). The court
cited 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 12 (3d ed. 1940). See also Ketchum v.
United States, 259 F.2d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
917 (1959); Sorenson v. United States, 168 Fed. 785, 799 (8th Cir. 1909);
Gormley v. United States, 167 F.2d 454, 458 (4th Cir. 1948).
32 Candless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 346 (1936). See 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 14 (3d ed. 1940).
33 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 27 (3d ed. 1940).
34 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
35 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 29 (3d ed. 1940).
36 147 F.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945). The
U.S. 875 (1945). The Court cited 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 12, 28 (3d ed.
1940). See Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. (27 U.S. 25, 44 (1829).
3 7 Silverfarb v. United States, 151 F.2d 11, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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Judge Edgerton, in a concurring opinion,37 quoted Wigmore's
conclusion that the "evidentiary fact offered does not need to
have strong, full, superlative probative value, does not need to
involve demonstration or to produce persuasion by its sole and
intrinsic force, but merely to be worth consideration by the jury."38
In a prosecution for removing and concealing nontax paid distilled
spirits, evidence of a conversation three or four months prior to
the offenses charged wherein the defendant stated that he was
again in the business of selling liquor was properly admitted as an
admission against interest over an objection based on remoteness,
since mere remoteness in the absence of extrinsic facts, such as a
chance to repent, affects only the weight and not the admissibility
of evidence. 39
Even though evidence is relevant it may be excluded because
of reasons of practical policy, such as introduction of collateral
matters, complicating the issues, prolonging the trial and confusing
the jury.40
United States v. Townsend4' quoted the view of Professor
McCormick: "But relevance is not always enough. There remains
the question, is its value worth what it costs .... This balancing
of intangibles . . .probative values against probable dangers-is
so much a matter where wise judges in particular situations may
differ that a leeway of discretion is generally recognized."
38 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 29, at 411 (3d ed. 1940).
39Wolstein v. United States, 80 F.2d 779, 780 (8th Cir. 1935).
40 Frank v. United States, 262 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v.
Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1944), citing 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE§§ 39(2), 42 (3d ed. 1940); United States v. Spaeth, 152 F. Supp. 216,
221 (N.D. Ohio 1957), citing 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 29a (3d ed. 1940).
court cited McCoRvicK, EVIDENCE § 152, at 319-20 (1954). See also United
States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D. N.Y. 1962), citing Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE 319 (1954); 6 WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1864, at 491 (3d ed.
1940); UmFom RULEs OF EVIDENCE 45; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 303
(1942).
41 United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 381 n.5 (D.D.C. 1957). The
court cited McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE 319 (1954); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1864 at 491; UNiuom RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 45; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
rule 303 (1942).
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II. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
"Presumptive evidence is said to be indirect or circumstantial
evidence. '42 The gist of circumstantial evidence is that: 43
[CJertain facts may be inferred or presumed from proof of other
facts. Thus, if property recently stolen be found in the possession
of a certain person, it may be presumed that he stole it, and such
presumption is sufficient to authorize the jury to convict, not-
withstanding the presumption of his innocence. So, if a person be
stabbed to death, and another, who was last seen in his company
was arrested near the spot with a bloody dagger in his possession,
it would raise, in the absence of explanatory evidence, a pre-
sumption of fact that he killed him. So, if it was shown that the
shoes of an accused person were of peculiar size or shape, and
footmarks were found in the mud or snow of corresponding size
or shape, it would raise a presumption, more or less strong, accord-
ing to the circumstances, that those marks had been made by the
feet of the accused person.
The Ninth Circuit has stated: "Circumstantial evidence is that
which establishes the fact to be proved only through inference
based on human experience that a certain circumstance or set of
circumstances is usually present when another certain circumstance
or set of circumstances is present. Direct evidence establishes the
fact without the necessity for such inference.144
But in Rodefla v. United States,45 the court pointed out: "Any
attempted differentiation between direct and circumstantial evi-
dence at times becomes indistinct and in law, unimportant." In
practice questions of relevancy arise only as to circumstantial evi-
dence.46
42 Ezzard v. United States, 7 F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1925). See 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 25 (3d ed. 1940). On circumstantial evidence see 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 25-26, 38-43 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 316-17,
324, 334, 401-06, 568, 650-52 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
192-99 (1962); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 293-94 (12th ed. 1955);
1 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 16-29 (5th ed. 1956).
43 Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 502-03 (1897). See also Rumely
v. United States, 293 Fed. 532, 551 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S.
713 (1923). Possession of stolen goods is circumstantial evidence as to
theft and burglary. Considine v. United States, 112 Fed. 342, 348 (6th
Cir. 1901), cert. denied, 184 U.S. 699 (1902). Compare Sorenson v.
United States, 168 Fed. 785, 793 (8th Cir. 1909).
44 Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d. 781, 783 (9th Cir. 150). See also
United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 803, 824 (S.D. Ga. 1906); McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE 316 (1954).
45 Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 1960). The court
cited 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 26 (3d ed. 1940).
4 6 McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 152, at 316 (1954).
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Judge Learned Hand, in holding that a charge on relevant
circumstantial evidence was not necessary, stated:
47
Some courts have held otherwise.... The requirement seems to
us a refinement which only seems to confuse laymen into supposing
that they should use circumstantial evidence otherwise than testi-
monial. All conclusions have implicit major premises drawn from
common knowldge; the truth of testimony depends as much upon
these, as do inferences from events. A jury tests a witness' credi-
bility by using their experience in the past as to similar utterances
of persons in a like position. That is precisely the same mental
process as when they infer from an object what has been its past
history, or from an event what must have preceded it.
Many federal courts have followed a rule giving the defendant
a great measure of protection. Unless there is substantial evidence
of facts which exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt, it is the
duty of the trial judge to grant a judgment of acquittal. This rule,
sometimes called the "reasonable hypothesis rule,"48 has been ap-
plied in all the Circuits, 49 but the Second, Fourth, Ninth and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 90 Wigmore has criticized the rule.5 '
47United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1933). The case
was followed in United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 809 (1943).
4 8 Note, 55 COLUm. L. REV. 549 (1955); Note, 38 GEO. L. J. 285 (1950).
49 (In order by Circuits) Yoffe v. United States, 153 F.2d 570, (1st Cir.
1946); United States v. Dolasco, 184 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1950); United
States v. Laffman, 152 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1945); United States v. Ginn,
124 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1954); United States v. Gasomiser Corp., 7
F.R.D. 712 (D. Del. 1947); Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1954); Bryan v. United States, 175 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949); Davies v.
United States, 177 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. Fenwick,
177 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1949); cf. United States v. Yeoman-Henderson
Inc., 193 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1952); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States,
178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949); Morgan v. United States, 159 F.2d 85
(10th Cir. 1947); Parnell v. United States, 64 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1933);
cf. Warner v. United States, 60 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1932); but see
Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d 646, 649 n.8 (10th Cir. 1958).
50 (In order by Circuits) United States v. Ploof, 311 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.
1963); United States v. Spagnuolo, 168 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1948); United
States v. Lawrenson, 298 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1962); White v. United
States, 279 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1960); Milanovich v. United States, 275
F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960); Moore v. United States, 271 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.
1959); Foster v. United States, 160 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1947); Bisno v.
United States, 299 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1961); Elwert v. United States,
231 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1956); Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277 (9th
Cir. 1953); McCoy v. United States, 169 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1948); Curley v.
United States, 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (reviews the holdings of
the other circuits).
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In many American courts a special charge was required in
circumstantial evidence cases. The charge was often in the language
of "where the evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to
exclude any reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt." But in
1954 the Supreme Court stated that "the better rule is that where
the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable
doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is
confusing and incorrect" because "circumstantial evidence in this re-
spect is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence. '52 This
was followed in a Delaware case53 and the Third, Fifth, Sixth and
Tenth Circuits.5
4
Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict. But,
"whenever a circumstance relied on as evidence of criminal guilt,
is susceptible of two inferences, one of which is in favor of inno-
cence, such circumstance is robbed of all probative value, even
though from the other inference, guilt may be fairly deducible." 55
A trial judge may properly refuse to instruct that the jury should
acquit if the facts and circumstances were as consistent with inno-
cence as with guilt where the evidence is direct and positive.56
Where the defendant wishes an instruction on circumstantial evi-
dence, he should request it; if he does not, there is no reversible
error.57 In one case, the court of appeals reversed a conviction
because "it would be equally consistent with the evidence" to infer
51 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 26 (3d ed. 1940).
52Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954) citing 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 25-26 (3d ed. 1940). This view is approved in 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 549, 588 (1950) and 38 GEO. L. J. 285 (1950).
53 United States v. Glazer, 129 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (D. Del. 1955).
54 (In order by Circuits) United States v. Olivo, 278 F.2d 415 (3d Cir.
1960); United States v. Giuliano, 263 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1959); United
States v. J. & R. Transport Co., 176 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Pias-
sick v. United States, 253 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1958); but see Strauss v.
United States, 311 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1963) and Clark v. United States,
293 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Young, 291 F.2d 389 (6th
Cir. 1961); Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1958).
55 Turinetti v. United States, 2 F.2d 15, 17 (8th Cir. 1924). See also Cal-
varesi v. United States, 216 F.2d 891, 905 (10th Cir. 1954).
5GPortman v. United States, 34 F.2d 406, 408 (8th Cir. 1929); Blanton v.
United States, 213 Fed. 320, 326 (8th Cir. 1914).
57Herman v. United States, 48 F.2d 479, 480 (5th Cir. 1931); Stassi v.
United States, 50 F.2d 526, 527-31 (8th Cir. 1931); Bloch v. United
States, 261 Fed. 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1919); McCoy v. United States, 169
F.2d 776, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 898 (1948).
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innocence.58 The case did not discuss whether a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty.59 It would seem that the court of
appeals weighed the evidence for itself.
Circuit Justice Clifford has pointed out that "whenever the
necessity arises for a resort to such evidence, objections to testi-
mony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored, for the reason
that the force and effect of circumstantial facts usually and almost
necessarily depend upon their connection with each other."'0 The
Supreme Court has taken this position in a murder prosecution.0'
In 1893, the United States Supreme Court stated in a civil
case:62
As has been frequently said, great latitude is allowed in the re-
ception of circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly
required, and, therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is want-
ing, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances the more correct their judgment is likely to be. The
competency of a collateral fact to be used as the basis of legitimate
argument is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the in-
ferences it may afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough
if these may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry,
or to assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded
in truth ... The modern tendency, both of legislation, and of the
decisions of courts, is to give as wide a scope as possible to the
investigation of facts. Courts of error are especially unwilling to
reverse cases because unimportant and possibly irrelevant testi-
mony may have crept in, unless there is reason to think that prac-
tical injustice has been thereby caused.
This language has been quoted in subsequent criminal cases.0 3 Often
in certain types of cases, fraud for example, the offense can be
established by circumstantial evidence only.
Similarly the evidence used in proof of a conspiracy will gen-
58 United States v. Tatcher, 131 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1942), reversing 43 F.
Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
59 MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 346 (4th ed. 1957).
GoUnited States v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Cas. 196, 203 (No. 15318) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1869). Compare Sorenson v. United States, 168 Fed. 785, 799 (8th
Cir. 1909).
G1Moore v. United States, 150 U.S. 57, 60 (1893).
62 Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 164 (1893).
63 Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 451 (1908); Smith v. United
States, 267 Fed. 665, 668-69 (8th Cir. 1920); Silverfarb v. United States,
40 A.2d 82, 84 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1944), affd, 151 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
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erally be, from the very nature of the case, circumstantial.64 "Con-
spiracy does indeed widen the scope of relevant evidence through
the operation of the principle of agency or representation by which
all are made responsible for the acts of each of the partners in
crime. This, however, is not a breakdown, it is merely an application
of the rules of evidence.
0 5
In a prosecution for conspiracy to commit a liquor offense,
the admission of evidence that a certain person had died from drink-
ing wood alcohol was held reversible error, because of a failure to
connect the defendant therewith.0 Likewise, evidence that certain
defendants were present from time to time in a garage in which
it was claimed that the liquor was manufactured was held insuf-
ficient to warrant conviction. Evidence which showed, at most, that
the defendant associated with one who was convicted of the crime,
and that he had knowledge that a crime was to be committed, or
had been committed is insufficient. 67 In a prosecution for con-
spiracy to violate the liquor laws, admission of evidence as to a
proposed raid by prohibition agents, introduced to show a motive
for the raid other than that testified by the defendant, was held
reversible error in the absence of evidence connecting it with the
defendant or his brother.68
Wigmore has suggested: "[T]he Court will often, where the
facts would be highly improper if irrelevant, require the other
facts, instead of being postponed, to be first offered so as to ensure
the presence of the proper foundation and leave nothing to the
sanguine expectations of counsel. This, however, is rather a ques-
tion of the order of presenting evidence."6 9 This position was quoted
favorably in D'Aguino v. United States.7 0
There have been federal cases suggesting that an inference on
an inference will not be permitted, that is to say, that a fact desired
64 Smith v. United States, 267 Fed. 665, 668-69 (8th Cir. 1920), cert. denied,
256 U.S. 691 (1921); Marrash v. United States, 168 Fed. 225, 229 (2d
Cir. 1909); United States v. Hutchins, 26 Fed. Cas. 442, 444 (No. 15430)(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1876); United States v. Cole, 25 Fed. Cas. 493, 522 (No.
14832) (C.C.D. Ohio 1853).
65 Kassin v. United States, 87 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1937).
66 Brauer v. United States, 299 Fed. 10, 13-14 (3d Cir. 1924).
67 O'Brien v. United States, 299 Fed. 568, 571 (8th Cir. 1924).
68 Nations v. United States, 52 F.2d 97, 100-05 (8th Cir. 1931).
69 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 40, at 433 (3d ed. 1940).
7 0 Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 364 n.16 (9th
Cir. 1951).
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to be used circumstantially must itself be established by testimonial
evidence.7 ' But in 1955, the Ninth Circuit stated that the old rule
"that an inference predicated upon an inference is inadmissible
has been repudiated."7 2
Circumstantial evidence has been admitted to establish the
offenses of counterfeiting," piracy,7 stealing a letter from the
mails, 75 murder on the high seas,76 perjury,77 loaning public money,78
conspiracy,79 mailing letters concerning lotteries,80 distilling,81
murder in Indian Territory,82 breaking into a post office,83 murder
in a territory, 4 concealing property while bankrupt,8 5 receiving
stolen goods,8 and using the mails to defraud.87 The government
71 Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1928). See criticism
in 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2131, at 572-73 n.5 (3d ed. 1940). See also
Nations v. United States, 52 F.2d 97, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1931).
72 Toliver v. United States, 224 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1955). The court
cited 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 41 (3d ed. 1940). See Jenings, Probative
Value of an Inference Drawn Upon Another Inference, With Special
Considerations of Ohio Decisions, 22 U. CiNc. L. REv. 39 (1953).
73 United States v. Roudenbush, 27 Fed. Cas. 902, 903 (No. 16198) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1832); United States v. Moses, 27 Fed. Cas. 5 (No. 15825) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1827).
74United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1291 (No. 15204) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1834).
75United States v. Martin, 26 Fed. Cas. 1183, 1184 (No. 15731) (C.C.D.
Ind. 1840).
70 United States v. Douglass, 25 Fed. Cas. 896, 897 (No. 14988) (C.C.D.C.
1813).
77 United States v. Gardiner, 25 Fed. Cas. 1245, 1247 (No. 15186a) (C.C.D.C.
1853).
78United States v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Cas. 196, 203 (No. 15318) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1869).
79 United States v. Hutchines, 26 Fed. Cas. 442, 444 (No. 15430) (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1876); United States v. Babcock, 24 Fed. Cas. 913, 926 (No. 14487)
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876).
80United States v. Noelke, 1 Fed. 426, 436-39 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1880).
81United States v. Ridgeway, 31 Fed. 144, 145-46 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887).
821oore v. United States, 150 U.S. 57, 60 (1893).
83 Considine v. United States, 112 Fed. 342, 348-50 (6th Cir. 1901), cert.
denied, 184 U.S. 699 (1902).
8 4
-Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 89 (1907).
85 United States v. Greenbaum, 252 Fed. 259, 266-67 (E.D. Mich. 1918).
80 Chass v. United States, 258 Fed. 911 (3d Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 250
U.S. 665 (1919).
87 Clark v. United States, 293 Fed. 301, 305 (5th Cir. 1923).
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has questioned a prospective juror on voir dire to ascertain if his
views on circumstantial evidence were such as to preclude him
from finding a verdict of guilty where the penalty prescribed by
law is death.88 However, in a case coming up from the Canal Zone
the court of appeals reduced the sentence from death to life im-
prisonment where the evidence was wholly circumstantial. 89 In
Dimmick v. United States" the court stated: "The general rule
is now well settled that in all criminal cases the corpus delicti may
be established by circumstantial evidence." 9' Circumstantial evi-
dence may also be used to establish the identity of the defendant!2
Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, the government may
show that another person who was in the vicinity at the time of
the offense could not have committed the offense.9 3 While in
direct evidence cases motive need not be shown, in cases of cir-
cumstantial evidence it may be important as showing whether the
offense was committed by the defendant or by some other person.9 4
In addition, circumstantial evidence may be used to prove venue.9 5
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that
circumstantial evidence is not alone enough to prove perjury.98
But in 1959, the Second Circuit doubted the rule that the evidence
must be direct.97 There had been previous decisions criticizing the
S8 Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224, 227 (1902).
89 Kemp v. Government of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938, 942 (5th Cir. 1948).
90Dimmick v. United States, 135 Fed. 257 (9th Cir. 1905).
91 Id. at 263. See also Wagner v. United States, 8 F.2d 581, 586 (8th Cir.
1925); Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1907).
92 McInerney v. United States, 143 Fed. 729, 739 (1st Cir. 1906). The
court cited 4 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2529 (1st ed. 1905). This is the
earliest citation to WIGMORE by a federal court that I have found.
93Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 568 (1897).
94 Schmidt v. United States, 133 Fed. 257, 263 (9th Cir. 1904).
95 Dean v. United States, 246 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Jones, 174 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 1949); Vernon v. United States, 146
Fed. 121, 126 (8th Cir. 1906); See Orfield, Burden of Proof and Pre-
sumptions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 30, 38
(1963).
98 Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1950). See Annot.,
88 A.L.R.2d 852, 859 (1963); Clayton v. United States, 284 Fed. 537,
539 (4th Cir. 1922); Allen v. United States, 194 Fed. 664, 668 (4th Cir.
1912).
97 United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 911 (1960). See also Jacobs v. United States, 31 F.2d 568 (6th
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 869 (1929).
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rule against circumstantial evidence.98 One court has held that
circumstantial evidence is admissible only where the nature of
the testimony is such that no direct testimony of its falsity could
be obtained, such as testimony as to the witness' knowledge or
belief. 9
Opinion evidence given by experts, for example a handwriting
analysis, is not circumstantial evidence, and does not call for an
instruction that it is.100
III. CHARACTER AND HABIT
A. CHARACTER IN GENERAL
Professor McCormick has noted: "A conspicuous instance in
which rules of admissibility have been molded by the effort to
balance probative values against countervailing dangers of prej-
udice, distraction, etc., is the area of rules about the admissibility
of evidence of character."'101
There are different types of proof which may be offered as
evidence of character. 02 There is testimony as to the defendant's
conduct as reflecting on his character; 0 3 testimony of a witness
as to his opinion of the person's character based on observation;
04
98 Goins v. United States, 99 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1938); Cohen v. United
States, 27 F.2d 713, 714 (2d Cir. 1928).
099Behrle v. United States, 100 F.2d 714, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See 51
COLUM. L. REV. 1056, 1057 (1951); 70 HARv. L. REV. 383, 384 (1956);
Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 852 (1963). See Orfield, Proof of Perjury and the
"Two Witnesses" Requirement in Federal Criminal Cases, 17 Sw. L.J.
227, 233-34 (1963).
100 Spaeth v. United States, 281 F.2d 361, 365 (6th Cir. 1955).
101 McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE 322 (1954). On character and habit, see 1 Wia-
MORE, EVIDENCE §§ 52-81, 92-97, 191-200, 202-05, 215-18 (3d ed. 1940), 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 300-71 (3d ed. 1940), 5 WIGMOm, EVIDENCE §§
1608-10 (3d ed. 1940), 7 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1980-86 (3d ed. 1940);
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 153, at 322-43 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 200-01, 213-14 (1962); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§
216-48 (12th ed. 1955); 1 UNDER=LL, CRImINAL EVIDENCE §§ 109-212 (5th
ed. 1956); 1 JONES, EVIDENCE §§ 165-79 (5th ed. 1958); Hale, Character
Evidence, 22 So. CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949); Ladd, Techniques of Character
Testimony, 24 IowA L. REV. 498 (1939); Udall, Character Proof in the
Law of Evidence, 18 U. Cnic. L. REV. 283 (1949).
1 02 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 322-23 (1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 52, 53,
193 (3d ed. 1940).
303 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 191-213 (3d ed. 1940).
104 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1980-86 (3d ed. 1940).
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and, testimony as to defendant's reputation. 0 5 The third type is
the preferred type; the other two, when received at all, are re-
ceived only in limited situations.
The Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute
does not deal with the question. Its comment to Rule 304 is: "No
rules are laid down as to proof of reputation when reputation is a
fact to be proved. When reputation is a material matter, it is
provable in the same manner as is any other disputed fact."'00
B. EVIDENCE To PROVE CHARACTER
Generally, particular good acts of the defendant may not be
shown. Judge Charles E. Clark has stated: "Defendants offer to
prove that on occasions other than those charged he sold lettuce
without tie-in with other vegetables was properly rejected as the
evidence was irrelevant.' 0 7
In a prosecution for bank robbery and for attempt to break
into a post office, the court stated: "As to other crimes committed
by appellant they were properly considered by the trial judge in
fixing sentence, as they had direct bearing upon the character of
appellant and the sort of sentence which ought to be imposed for
the crime of which he had been convicted.' 08 In sentencing, the
trial judge may consider out-of-court information. 0 9
Some statutes have been construed as allowing the fact of
prior conviction to be considered by the jury before verdict." 0
Wigmore calls this method "decidedly an inferior one.""' In a
prosecution for rape evidence of the complainant's prior unchaste
conduct was held admissible."12 Wigmore states: "The better view
105 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1608-21 (3d ed. 1940).
106 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 304 (1942).
107United States v. Shapiro, 159 F.2d 890, 891 (2d Cir. 1947), citing 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 195, at -665-66 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore suggests
that on principle such evidence might well come in.
108 Parker v. United States, 248 F.2d 803, 804 (4th Cir. 1957).
109 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949).
210 Hefferman v. United States, 50 F.2d 554, 556 (3d Cir. 1931); Smith v.
United States, 41 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1930); Massey v, United States, 281
Fed. 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1922).
11 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 196, at 670 (3d ed. 1940).
"
2 Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 1953).
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is that which admits the evidence.""13 In a prosecution of a com-
mon offender, evidence of particular acts is admissible. 114
Circuit Justice McLean in 1840, stated: "The witness cannot
advert to particular facts as to his personal knowledge of the in-
dividual impeached, but to his general reputation for truth.""15
In 1859, the Supeme Court via Mr. Justice Clifford stated that an
"impeaching witness is not required to speak from his own knowl-
edge of the acts and transactions from which the character or
reputation of the witness has been derived, nor indeed is he al-
lowed to do so."" 06 In 1952, a court clearly held that a character
witness may not offer his personal opinion of the truth, honesty,
and integrity of the defendant."17 He may testify only as to his
reputation in the community.
In several early cases lower federal courts held that it was not
error to ask an impeaching witness, after testifying that the gen-
eral reputation of an opposing witness was bad, whether, from his
knowledge of that general reputation he would believe the witness
on oath."18 Mr. Justice Wayne, dissenting in a Supreme Court
civil case stated: "The regular mode of examining into the character
of the person in question, is to ask the witness whether he knows
his general reputation among his neighbors-what that reputation
is, and whether from such knowledge he would believe him upon
oath." 1 9 In a subsequent civil case, the Supreme Court referred
to the conflict in the authorities and to Greenleaf's view that the
"13 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 200, at 683 (3d ed. 1940).
114McNutt v. United States, 267 Fed. 670, 674 (8th Cir. 1920); United
States v. Bonham, 31 Fed. 808 (D.S.C. 1887); United States v. Jackson,
26 Fed. Cas. 556 (No. 15455) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1875). See 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 203 (3d ed. 1940).
115United States v. Vansickle, 28 Fed. Cas. 361, 362 (No. 16609) (C.C.D.
Mich. 1840).
116 Teese v. Huntington, 23 How. (64 U.S.) 2, 13 (1859).
117 Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 811, 830 (9th Cir. 1952), rev'd on, other
grounds, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). The court cited 7 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE §
1980 (3d ed. 1940). See generally 7 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1980-86 (3d
ed. 1940); McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE 94-95, 323 (1954).
118 United States v. Vansickle, 28 Fed. Cas. 361, 362 (No. 16609) (C.C.D.
Mich. 1840); United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 550, 552 (No. 16675)
(C.C.D.C. 1836); United States v. Masters, 26 Fed. Cas. 1197 (No. -15739)
(C.C.D.C. 1834).
119 Gaines v. Relf, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 472, 554 (1851).
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weight of authority was against such a question and to Taylor's view
to the contrary. 20 In 1919, the Fifth Circuit upheld the question.121
In 1925, the Seventh Circuit rejected the question. It expressed
the opinion that the weight of authority was against such question
and referred to Greenleaf's similar view. 22 The court did not cite
the cases as to weight of authority. The next year the Eighth
Circuit referred favorably to Greenleaf's view, but based its ruling
on the ground that the first question dealt with the reputation for
honesty and veracity of the witness being impeached and was too
broad a basis on which to rest the second question as to whether
the witness would testify falsely. 23 But two years later the same
court seemed to hold that the trial judge had discretion to allow
such a question, but that on the particular facts it was not reversible
error not to allow the question. 2 4 In 1963, after a careful review
of the cases and authorities, the Sixth Circuit upheld the ques-
tion. 25 It was pointed out that most state courts now allow the
question and that Wigmore favored it.
C. CHARACTER As EViDENTIARY OF AN ACT
At one time there was a presumption of the good character
of the defendant; and, on the defendant's request the jury was to
be so instructed. 26 But subsequent decisions rejected this view. 27
In 1918, the Supreme Court squarely held that there was no pre-
sumption of good character and doubted that this was the rule in
1789.128
Evidence of the general reputation of a defendant charged
120 Teese v. Huntington, 23 How. (64 U.S.) 2, 11-13 (1859).
121 Held v. United States, 260 Fed. 932, 933 (5th Cir. 1919). The court cited
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1985 (1st ed. 1904).
122 Colbeck v. United States, 10 F.2d 401, 403 (7th Cir. 1925).
123 Colbeck v. United States, 14 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1926).
124 Swafford v. United States, 25 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1928).
125 United States v. Walker, 313 F.2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1963).
126 Garst v. United States, 180 Fed. 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1910); Lowdon v.
United States, 149 Fed. 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1906); Mullen v. United States,
106 Fed. 892, 894 (6th Cir. 1901); United States v. Guthrie, 171 Fed. 528,
532 (S.D. Ohio 1909).
127 Price v. United States, 218 Fed. 149, 150 (8th Cir. 1914); United States v.
Smith, 217 Fed. 839 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
128 Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918). One judge dissented.
The lower court also held against the presumption. 240 Fed. 320, 324
(8th Cir. 1917). See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475
(1948); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 290, at 176-77 (3d ed. 1940).
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with making a false deposition is competent, and it is error to
exclude such testimony upon the theory that it should be offered
only after the defendant himself has testified.129 He may introduce
testimony as to his general reputation as a law-abiding citizen
whether he testifies or not.130 Evidence as to good character should
not be excluded merely because the questions are not put in proper
form.1'1
While in general the government may not attack the defendant's
reputation before the defendant has put it in issue, 32 where the
trial court is passing on probable cause for a search and seizure
of a truck, there may be inquiry as to the defendant's reputation
as this bears on probable cause. 33 This may be done in the presence
of the jury if the defendant fails to object. If evidence offered by
the government is otherwise competent, relevant and material it
is not objectionable on the ground that it may tend incidentally
to put the defendant's character in issue.1
3 4
Evidence of good character is admissible to show want of
intent. 3 5 Wigmore points out that "a defendant may offer his good
character to evidence the improbability of his doing the act
charged.' ' 36 This language was accepted in Petersen v. United
States. 37 The Supreme Court stated that "character is relevant
2 9 Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 363 (1896). This case is men-
tioned as the leading case on good character in criminal cases in Sunder-
land v. United States, 19 F.2d 202, 214 (8th Cir. 1927). On permitting
the defendant to produce evidence of his good character see McCoRvncX,
EVIDENCE 333-38 (1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 55-60, 197 (3d ed. 1940),
3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 925, 988 (3d ed. 1940), 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§
1980-86 (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1504 (1931); Annot., 68 A.L.R.
1068 (1930); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 1210 (1930); Annot., 80 A.L.R. 227 (1932);
1 UNDERHILL, CRImiNAL EVIDENCE §§ 190-202 (5th ed. 1956); 1 WHARTON,
CRII iNAL EVIDENCE §§ 221-27 (12th ed. 1955); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
op EVIDENCE 200-05 (1962).
130 Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305, 308 (4th Cir. 1937).
131 Cohen v. United States, 291 Fed. 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1923).
132 United States v. Walker, 313 F.2d 236, 238 (6th Cir. 1963). United States
v. Rinaldi, 301 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1962).
'33 Crosby v. United States, 231 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 831 (1956).
'34 Cochran v. United States, 310 F.2d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 1962).
135 Masters v. United States, 42 App. D.C. 350, 357 (1914).
136 1 WIGMORE, EVIDEN E § 56, at 450 (3d ed. 1940).
137 Petersen v. United States, 268 F.2d 87, 88 -(10th Cir. 1959).
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in resolving probabilities of guilt."'u8 The rule applies to all offenses
including misdemeanors. 139
But as early as 1827, Circuit Justice Story instructed the jury
that: 140
[T]he general good character of the defendant may be properly
brought into the cause, and ought to have weight with the jury
in all cases, where the facts are doubtful, or admit of different
interpretations. But where the evidence is positive, and satis-
factory to the jury, such good character certainly cannot over-
come the just presumption of guilt arising therefrom.
A district judge, in 1876, concluded that evidence of good charac-
ter was competent in all cases, not simply doubtful ones' 4 ' and
this view was taken by the Supreme Court in 1896 when it stated
that "good character, when considered in connection with the other
evidence in the case, may generate a reasonable doubt."'142
Judge Learned Hand stated that "evidence of good character
is to be used like any other, once it gets before the jury, and the
less they are told about the grounds for its admission, or what they
shall do with it, the more likely they are to use it sensibly. The
subject seems to gather mist which discussion serves only to
thicken.' 43
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that it
is the duty of the trial judge, even in the absence of a request, to
instruct on the subject of character evidence. 144 But it is question-
138 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
139 Egan v. United States, 287 Fed. 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
140 United States v. Freeman, 25 Fed. Cas. 1208, 1210 (No. 15162) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1827). See also United States v. Allen, 24 Fed. Cas. 772, 775 (No.
14432) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1868); United States v. Knowles, 26 Fed. Cas.
800, 802 (No. 15540) (N.D. Cal. 1864); United States v. Emerson, 25
Fed. Cas. 1013 (No. 15051) (C.C.D. Ind. 1855); United States v. Rouden-
bush, 27 Fed. Cas. 902, 930 (No. 16198) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832).
141 United States v. Hutchins, 26 Fed. Cas. 442, 445 (No. 15430) (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1876).
142 Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366 (1896). One justice merely
concurred in the judgment, and one dissented. See also Rosen v. United
States, 271 Fed. 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1920); Rowe v. United States, 97 Fed.
779, 781 (8th Cir. 1899).
143 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). This case was
quoted favorably in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 474 n.5
(1948). On instructions to the jury as to the force of character evidence,
see Annot., 68 A.L.R. 1068 (1930).
144 Hermansky v. United States, 7 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1925). But compare
United States v. Quick, 128 F.2d 832, 835 (3d Cir. 1942); Stassi v. United
States, 50 F.2d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 1931).
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able that this is the weight of authority.145 A general instruction is
sufficient where the defendant does not ask for a detailed instruc-
tion.146 In 1942, the Third Circuit held, in reversing the trial court,
that the defendant on request is entitled to an instruction as to
character evidence which sets forth: the purpose of character evi-
dence, i.e., to generate a reasonable doubt; the probative status
of such evidence, i.e., that it be considered by the jury whether or
not the other evidence is clear or doubtful; and the possible effect
of character evidence, i.e., when considered along with other evi-
dence in the case if a reasonable doubt exists as to defendant's
guilt he is entitled to acquittal. 47
In 1944, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld
a trial court in its refusal to instruct that the circumstances may
be such that an established reputation for good character would
alone create a reasonable doubt.148 The court concluded that there
were decisions from the Sixth, Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits upholding such a requested instruction. But the Second,
Third, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits were contrary; and were
accepted as correct for the Fourth Circuit. In 1950, the District
of Columbia adhered to its view. 49 In 1959, the Tenth Circuit
stated that "this court has held without deviation that when evi-
dence of good character is submitted, the jury should be instructed
that character testimony may be such that it alone may create a
reasonable doubt, although without it the other evidence would be
convincing of guilt."'' 5 In the Seventh Circuit, an instruction that
the mere fact that the defendant may have a good reputation prior
to the time of the alleged crime could not be used by the jury
'45 Kreiner v. United States, 11 F.2d 722, 731 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied,
271 U.S. 688 (1926). This case was followed in Kinard v. United States,
96 F.2d 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See also United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 639 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
742 (1946); Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945).
'46Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205, 217 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U.S. 674 (1934).
147United States v. Quick, 128 F.2d 832, 835 (3rd Cir. 1942). Compare
United States v. Dewrinsky, 41 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. N.J. 1941). See also
Hawley v. United States, 133 F.2d 966, 972 (10th Cir. 1943).
148 Mannix v. United States, 140 F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1944).
1 49 Villaroman v. United States, 184 F.2d 261, 263 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
150 Johnson v. United States, 269 F.2d 72, 74 (10th Cir. 1959). See also
Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 544 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 983 (1957); Miller v. United States, 120 F.2d 968, 971 (10th
Cir. 1941).
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as an excuse for acquittal, was held reversible error.1 1 By 1959,
the rule that character evidence alone may create a reasonable
doubt was rejected in all the circuits but the Seventh and Tenth.15 2
In 1948, the Supreme Court pointed out that it had previously
held that character testimony "alone, in some circumstances may
be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt and that in the
federal courts a jury in a proper case should be so instructed."'5 3
But this decision was held to be narrow in scope because of the
use of the word "proper.'1 54
Suppose that the doing of the act charged is not in dispute. The
Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit has stated: "No reason is
suggested and we see none for concluding that evidence of good
character for truth, honesty and integrity would tend to support
a claim of innocence when the defendant admits a deliberate re-
fusal to obey an order of the induction board, basing his refusal
on conscientious grounds.' 5 5 Yet it should be admissible when the
criminal intent remains in issue.' 56 Only rarely is intent not in
issue.
It is grounds for a new trial if the government, in its argument
to the jury, points out that the defendant failed to offer evidence
of good reputation. 5 7 If the government withdraws the argument,
possibly the error is cured.'58 The court may cure the error by
instructing the jury to disregard the argument.159
As early as 1802 it was held that the government cannot give
evidence of the general bad character of the defendant unless the
'51 United States v. Semeniuk, 193 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952).
152 Petersen v. United States, 268 F.2d 87, 89 n.3 (10th Cir. 1959) (citing
cases). But Judge Murrah criticized the minority view. See also Smith
v. United States, 305 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1962).
'53 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). The court cited
Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361 (1896).
1"4 Black v. United States, 309 F.2d 331, 343 (8th Cir. 1962); Smith v. United
States, 305 F.2d 197, 206 (9th Cir. 1962).
153 Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945).
156 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 56, at 453-54 (3d ed. 1940).
157 Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 560 (1918); Middleton v. United
States, 49 F.2d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 1931) ; Lowdon v. United States, 149 Fed.
673, 675 (5th Cir. 1906); McKnight v. United States, 97 Fed. 208, 209 (6th
Cir. 1899).
15 8 Lowdon v. United States, 149 Fed. 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1906).
159 Dale v. United States, 66 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1933); United States v.
Bonner, 21 F. Supp. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1937).
RELEVANCY IN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
defendant first gives evidence to support his character.160 The
character of a defendant is put in issue only when he calls witnesses
to attest to his reputation.' 61 The defendant does not put his charac-
ter in issue when he testifies to service in the armed forces and hon-
orable discharge, as this is merely introduction.
Evidence of bad character "is never admitted until the accused
has first put his character in issue, or, in other words, has laid the
foundation for its introduction by offering to show that he is of
good character; and then the counter-proof is properly admitted as
rebutting testimony.'1 62 Where the defendant pleads entrapment
the government may cross-examine the defendant not only as to
other felonies, but also as to misdemeanors, in order to show his
predisposition.163
A character witness for the defendant may be asked whether
or not he had heard disparaging rumors about the defendant. 6 4 A
witness for a defendant charged with stealing a letter from the
mail may be asked whether the defendant had not been charged
with passing counterfeit money.165 A witness who testified to the
good reputation of the defendant may be properly cross-examined
as to whether he had ever heard of the defendant being accused
of acts inconsistent with the character attributed to him.16
A character witness for the defendant in a liquor prosecution
160 United States v. Carrigo, 25 Fed. Cas. 310 (No. 14735) (C.C.D.C. 1802).
See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); Greer v.
United States, 245 U.S. 559, 560 (1918); Lott v. United States, 218 F.2d 675,
678 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Jones, 208 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1953);
United States v. Modern Reed & Rattan Co., 159 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir.
1947); Mackreth v. United States, 103 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1939);
Mullen v. United States, 106 Fed. 892, 894 (6th Cir. 1901); United States
v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 349, 354 (No. 15382) (C.C.D. Me. 1858). See 1
WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1940).
161 United States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1960); United States
v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1957).
162 United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 349, 354 (No. 15382) (C.C.D. Me.
1858). See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479, n.15 (1948),
citing 1 WIGMOmE, EviDENCE § 58 (3d ed. 1940); Josey v. United States,
135 F.2d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
163 Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1961); Carlton v.
United States, 198 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1952).
1643 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
165 United States v. Whitaker, 28 Fed. Cas. 538, 539 (No. 16672) (C.C.D.
Ohio 1855).
166 Jung Quey v. United States, 222 Fed. 766, 771 (9th Cir. 1915). See 1
WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 197 (3d ed. 1940).
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may be asked whether he had heard of defendant's being arrested
for violation of the liquor law; 6 7 or that the defendant had been
convicted of a crime.168 The answer goes directly to the weight
and credibility of the testimony of the character witness. In one
case a record of conviction was admitted in rebuttal where the
witness had denied hearing of it.169 Questions may be non-
prejudicial in view of the answers given and instructions to the
jury.170
Cross-examination of the defendant's character witness as to
whether rumors of the defendant's commission of another crime,
if heard by the witness, would alter his testimony, if promptly
objected to, is improper. 71 The question was based on the assump-
tion that the rumors were facts. Cross-examining the defendant's
character witness, who had testified as to the defendant's reputa-
tion prior to the date of the alleged conspiracy as to whether they
had read in the newspapers about discovery of whiskey and fake
whiskey labels in the defendant's room shortly after the alleged
conspiracy was erroneous. 72 The inquiry is to be limited to what
people thought about the defendant's character and not what the
witness thought. The matter in issue was the general reputation
of the party. Cross-examination is not limited to inquiry as to
reputation at the time and prior to the time of the alleged offense.
Character witnesses for the defendant may be asked whether they
had heard that the defendant had been arrested two years before
on a charge of operating a still and saloon.173
A witness who has testified to the good reputation of the de-
fendant for the particular trait may be asked specifically as to
1 7 Filippelli v. United States, 6 F.2d 121, 125 (9th Cir. 1925). But the wit-
ness may not be asked whether he had heard that the defendant had
been arrested frequently for violation of the liquor law.
168 Mitrovich v. United States, 15 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926).
169 Chiccarello v. United States, 68 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1933). This appears
unsound. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988, at 619 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
170 Reuben v. United States, 86 F.2d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 671 (1937).
171 Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401, 408 (8th Cir. 1937). See also Pittman
v. United States, 42 F.2d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1930).
172 Sloan v. United States, 31 F.2d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 1929).
173 Spalitto v. United States, 39 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1930). The court cited
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988 (2d ed. 1923). See also Clark v. United States,
23 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Mitrovich v. United States, 15 F.2d 163,
164 (9th Cir. 1926); Jung Quey v. United States, 222 Fed. 766, 771 (9th
Cir. 1915). Compare Sacks v. United States, 41-App. D.C. 34, 36 (1913).
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whether he has heard that the defendant has committed particular
criminal acts inconsistent with the reputation vouched for on
direct examination.'7 4 But the witness may not be asked whether
he knows that the defendant has committed other crimes.17 5 On
principle as to indictments or informations, convictions, or repeated
arrests, or imprisonment, it should be possible to ask the witness
if he knows of these. But the federal courts have merely held that
there is not reversible error if the answer is in the negative, or if
the record does not show any answer, 76 or if no objection was
made at the trial. 77
In a prosecution for assault with a dangerous weapon, questions
to character witnesses as to whether "they had heard that the
defendant had been arrested in 1940 for disorderly conduct" were
allowed. 1 s
In one case a defendant was tried in 1947 for bribery of a
revenue agent. On direct examination the defendant acknowledged
a conviction for a trade mark violation in 1927. He produced wit-
nesses for his honesty and veracity, some of whom had known him
for thirty years On cross-examination they were asked: "Did you
ever hear that on October 11, 1920, the defendant . . was arrested
for receiving stolen goods." They answered in the negative. The
government assured the trial judge in private of the truth of the
fact of such arrest, which was not questioned. The judge explained
to the jury the limited purpose of the question. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction. 17 9 This was in accord with the weight
174 Stewart v. United States, 104 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Clark v.United States, 23 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1927), citing 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 988 (2d ed. 1923). See McCoRmicK, EviF-'c. 335 (1954).
1751 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948); Kasper v. United
States, 225 F.2d 275, 279 (9th Cir. 1955); Stewart v. United States, 104
F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
176 Lucas v. United States, 104 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
177 Saunders v. United States, 192 F.2"d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
178 Josey v. United States, 135 F.2d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1943), citing 3
WIGMORE, EviENcE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
'79 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), noted in 15 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 299 (1949); 34 CoRNELL L. Q. 642 (1949); 53 DiCm. L. REv. 339(1949); 41 IowA L. REV. 325, 347-48 (1956); 34 IowA L. REv. 700 (1949);
40 J. Cmv. L., C. & P.S. 58 (1949); 47 McH. L. REV. 843 (1949); 22 So.
CAL. L. REV. 489 (1949) ; 22 TEMP. L. Q. 347 (1949); 17 U. CH. L. REv.525, 532 (1950); 12 U. DET. L.i. 174 (1949); 2 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1949).
The Court of Appeals had also affirmed. United States v. Michelson,
165 F.2d 732, 734 (2d Cir. 1948), noted in 22 TEvp. L. Q. 347 (1949). The
Supreme Court did not accept a rule suggested by the Court of Appeals,
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of authority,180 but the holding is questionable. The mere asking
by the government, no matter what the answer, may suggest to the
jury that the imputation is true. The dissent in the case would
have limited the cross-examination to a very general one on op-
portunities for knowledge of reputation excluding completely in-
quiries about other crimes or rumors thereof.'8 ' But this might
unduly encourage the use of false or biased character-witnesses. 8 2
One protection would be to require the government to give its
professional statement to the judge, in the absence of the jury, that
it believes and has reasonable ground to believe that the crimes or
misconduct were actually committed by the defendant. 183 The gov-
ernment's assurance should be based on the statements of witnesses,
believed to be credible, who purport to have first-hand knowledge.
The trial judge can stop the government when it asks questions in
bad faith. 18 4 Judge Jerome Frank thought that on the merits ques-
tions are improper unless they relate to offenses similar to those
for which the defendant is on trial.185
In an income tax prosecution, it was held that the trial court
properly cut short, after objection, a question of the government to
a defense witness whether he had heard that the defendant was
convicted for violation of labor laws. 8 6 The court at once told the
jury to disregard it. No reversible error was found. The govern-
ment could properly ask if the witness had heard that the defendant
had been in court on a conspiracy to steal charge and was freed
after making restitution, when the defendant did not try to prove
the falsity of the intimation and did not ask for an instruction as
to the limited purpose for which the question was asked.187
In a prosecution for possession of counterfeit notes, the de-
fendant's character witness stated on direct examination that the
namely, that the cross examination be limited to questions which relate
to offenses similar to those for which the defendant is on trial.
180 40 J. CRIn. L., C. & P.S. 58, 59 (1949); 22 TEMP. L. Q. 347 (1949); 2 VAND.
L. REV. 479 (1949); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1504 (1931).
181 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 496 (1947). The court cited 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
182 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 58 (3d ed. 1940).
18 3 United States v. Giddins, 273 F.2d 843, 845 (2d Cir. 1960); McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 158, at 337 (1954).
184 Sloan v. United States, 31 F.2d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1929).
185 United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732, 735 n.8 (2d Cir. 1948).
186 Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284, 292 (1st Cir. 1950).
187 Malatkofski v. United States, 179 F.2d 905, 913 (1st Cir. 1950).
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defendant's reputation was good. It was held proper upon cross-
examination to question these witnesses concerning previous ar-
rests of the defendant. 188 It was not necessary first to ascertain
whether in fact there had been such arrests or that they had been
for crimes involving moral turpitude. Questioning as to infrac-
tions similar in nature to those for which the defendant was on
trial was proper. 8 9 In an income tax prosecution, cross-examination
of the witnesses as to whether he had heard of the defendant being
arrested on a certain date for issuing fradulent checks was held
prejudicial where there was no showing that the defendant had
been arrested and no instruction limiting the use of the evidence
was given.190
Following Michelson v. United States,'91 it is reversible error
where the cross-examination of the defendant's character witness
occurred in the presence of the jury, where cross-examination was
to what the witnesses knew, not what they had heard, and where
the trial court permitted the government to assure the jury of
record evidence of the actuality of each arrest and conviction in-
quired about. 92 The Court of Appeals reversed although only a
general objection was made in the trial court. Correct instructions
to the jury did not cure the error.
It has been stated broadly that a witness "may properly be
cross-examined as to whether or not he ever heard of some incident
that might have a bearing on his good reputation.' 9 3 Testimony
that witnesses, by reputation, knew of the defendant as an "under-
world" man and a "strong-arm" man was admissible to prove the
charge that conspiracy to commit extortion contemplated the use of
persons known to the victim to have underworld reputations and to
possess the necessary power to execute the conspirators' demand
by force and violence and that one of the defendants was enlisted
for that purpose. 94 This was a case of multiple admissibility and
the trial judge had instructed accordingly.
188 United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1952).
'19 United States v. H. Wood & Sons, 215 F.2d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1954).
190 United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 1954).
191 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
192 Roberson v. United States, 237 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 1956).
193 Segal v. United States, 246 F.2d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 1957).
194 Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 740 (9th Cir. 1963). The court cited
UNIFoRm RULE OF EVIDENCE rule 47; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 306 (1)
(1942) ; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 55, 57 (3d ed. 1940).
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A question directed to a character witness for the defendant
during cross-examination as to whether he had heard of the de-
fendant's claim of a constitutional privilege before a congressional
investigating committee had no probative value; or, if it had proba-
tive value, such value was outweighed by the possible impact on
the jury of equating such plea of privilege with guilt; and was
prejudicial error.193 A concurring judge thought it also improper
to ask whether the witness had heard that the defendant had been
convicted of criminal contempt of court because this would not bear
on the defendant's veracity. 19
The question may not be hypothetical nor assume unproven
facts.197 The following question is thus improper: "If you had heard
that, would it modify your judgment some as to his law abiding
citizenship."'-08
The reputation subject to proof is that respecting the trait of
character involved in the offense charged.109 Where prosecution
was founded on the initial larceny of an automobile, it was compe-
tent to prove his general reputation for honesty and integrity, and
reversible error occurs if it is excluded.2 0 0 It is not enough to simply
allow evidence as to reputation for being an upright, law-abiding
citizen. Gambling and liquor dealing would not necessarily prove
want of honesty and integrity. In a prosecution for false entry in
a bank report, testimony as to the defendant's character for
"morality and sobriety" was held properly excluded.20 1 It was suf-
ficient to allow testimony as to reputation for truthfulness, veracity,
and honesty.
Inquiry is limited to the trait or traits involved in the crime on
195 Travis v. United States, 247 F.2d 130, 133 (10th Cir. 1957).
19 Id. at 136.
197 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 n.17 (1948); United States
v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135, 150 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 906(1959); Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401, 408 (8th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 644 (1937).
198 United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135, 150 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 906 (1959).
199Hawley v. United States, 133 F.2d 966, 972 (10th Cir. 1943). See Mc-
CoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 158, at 334 (1954). But in United States v. Latin,
139 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1943), in a prosecution for setting up an un-
registered still, the defendant was held entitled to prove good reputation
as to 'noral character."
200Keady v. United States, 62 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1933). The court cited 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 59 (2d ed. 1923).
201 Harper v. United States, 170 Fed. 385, 390 (8th Cir. 1909).
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trial such as honesty in theft cases.20 2 In a prosecution for rape, the
witness should not be asked whether he had heard that the de-
fendant was convicted of furnishing liquor to a minor.20 3 In a
prosecution for income tax evasion, the court may refuse evidence
of the defendant that he was charitable.20 4 In a prosecution for
treason, the inquiry should not be as to "truth, honesty, and in-
tegrity," but rather as to "truth and veracity" as at common law.20 5
In a prosecution for negligent homicide, the defendant may not
have admitted in evidence a certificiate of honorable discharge
from the Army to show character. 20 6 It is objectionable as hearsay.
Where the court, although it instructed that the defendant had been
honorably discharged from the United States Army eight years
earlier, refused to admit the defendant's service record as evidence
of good character, no reversible error occurred. 20 7 Proof of good
character may be limited to character at the date of the commission
of the offense.
20 8
If the defendant has introduced evidence of good reputation,
the government is not allowed to prove in rebuttal of good reputa-
tion, judgments of convictions for crimes involving the same trait
in or near the community in which the defendant lived, and within
a reasonable time before the commission of the offense on trial. In
a prosecution for tax and liquor violations, it was held error to
allow the government to prove previous convictions for similar
offenses and specific acts after the offense on trial on the issue of
reputation. The court stated: "There was no proof that the prior
convictions and the subsequent unlawful acts of the appellant were
known to the community, or that they in any wise impaired the
reputation of the appellant as a man of honesty and integrity.) 20 9
202 Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 n.1 (9th Cir. 1945); Clark v.
United States, 23 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Smith v. United States, 161
U.S. 85, 88 (1896).
203 Sacks v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 34 (1913).
204 Steinberg v. United States, 162 F.2d 120, 124 (5th Cir. 1947).
2 05 Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 372 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952).
206 Ridgell v. United States, 54 A.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1947),
noted in 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 137 (1949). Urging admission, see 5 WIG-
MoRE, EVIDENCE § 1675(a) (3d ed. 1940); 1 WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 59, at
462-63 (3d ed. 1940).
207 French v. United States, 232 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1956).
208 Bryant v. United States, 257 Fed. 378, 387 (5th Cir. 1919). See Mc-
CoRm cK, EViDENCE § 158, at 335 (1954).
209 Eley v. United States, 117 F.2d 526, 529 (6th Cir. 1941).
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In criticism, it has been pointed out that such convictions bear
strongly on reputation, are easily provable, and, while there is
danger of prejudice, the defendant may avoid it by not injecting
the issue of reputation.210 If the defendant takes the stand other
convictions may be shown. If he does not, the jury may in fact
assume his guilt, but it will make no such assumption when he
merely fails to open the door of reputation.
It was held prejudicial error in a court-martial for rape not
to allow the accused to introduce evidence of the reputation of the
complaining witness for chastity in her community.2 11 This ap-
proach is supported by writers on evidence.212
In a plea of self-defense evidence of the deceased's character
and belligerency, though unknown to the defendant, is admissible
in corroboration of the defendant's testimony that the deceased was
the aggressor. The defendant was entitled to show that the de-
ceased was aggressive when drunk. The court quoted the views of
Wigmore: 213
When the issue of self-defense is made in a trial for homicide,
and thus a controversy arises whether the deceased was the ag-
gressor, one's persuasion will be more or less affected by the
character of the deceased; it may throw much light on the proba-
bilities of the deceased's action . . . .The additional element of
communication is unnecessary; for the question is what the de-
ceased probably did, not what the defendant probably thought the
deceased was going to do. The inquiry is one of objective oc-
currence, not of subjective belief.
Another theory of admissibility is to show the state of mind of
the defendant. The Supreme Court has stated that "any evidence
which, according to the common experience of mankind, tended to
show that the defendant had reasonable cause to apprehend great
bodily harm from the conduct of the deceased towards him just
before the killing was admissible" including "evidence that the
210 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 158, at 337 (1954).
2"11 Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238, 249 (M.D. Pa. 1946).
2 12 See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 62 (3d ed. 1940); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 201-02 (1962).
213 Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 63, at 467, 470-71 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §
160 (1954). See Notes, 3 ARK. L. REV. 464 (1949); 25 CALIF. L. REV. 459
(1937); 6 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 224 (1949); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 1029 (1929);
Annot., 34 A.L.R. 2d 451 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
200-01 (1962); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 160 (1954); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 217 (12th ed. 1955); 3 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 647
(5th ed. 1956).
RELEVANCY IN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
deceased had the general reputation of being a quarrelsome and
dangerous person," especially "if his character was known to the
defendant. 2
14
D. CHARACTER AS AN IssuE IN THE CASE
In a prosecution for keeping a house of ill-fame, the reputation
of the visitors of the house was admitted.215 In a similar prosecu-
tion, the reputations of some inmates of three or four years prior
were admitted as showing the defendant's knowledge. 216 In a
prosecution for assisting patronage of a house of ill-fame, the repu-
tation of the defendant's house-detective as a panderer was
admitted.217
E. CHARACTER USED TO IMPEACH
A court has stated: "Having testified in his own behalf, there
was no error in permitting impeaching evidence of his general bad
character, and his bad character for truth and veracity. 218
Where a defendant has put her reputation as a witness in issue,
the government may inquire whether she had been convicted in
absentia for operating a bawdy house and had forfeited bond.21 9
When the defendant becomes a witness, impeaching evidence is
admissible to prove that his general reputation for truth and
veracity is bad, although evidence is not admissible to show that
his general character is bad.220
It is familiar practice to allow proof of the bad character of a
witness for veracity by evidence of conviction of crime and by the
testimony of reputation witnesses. This would seem to constitute
another exception to the policy against using evidence of character
to show conduct, namely here to show that the witness may have
testified to an untruth.2 2 1 The author has dealt with this subject
elsewhere. 222
214 Smith v. United States, 161 U.S. 85, 88 (1896). See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 246 (3d ed. 1940).
215 United States v. Stevens, 27 Fed. Cas. 1312 (No. 16391) (C.C.D.C. 1833).
216 Graul v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 543, 548 (1918).
217 Thaler v. United States, 261 Fed. 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1919).
218 Hyche v. United States, 135 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1943). See 3 WIGMoPE,
EVIDENCE § 925 (3d ed. 1946).
219 United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92, 96 (4th Cir. 1962).
220United States v. Walker, 313 F.2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1963), citing 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 890, 925 (3d ed. 1940).
221McCoRMICIK, EVIDENCE § 161 (1954).
222 Orfield, Impeachment and Support of Witnesses in Federal Criminal
Cases, 11 KAN. L. REV. 447, 460-73 (1963).
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F. HABIT AND CUSTOM
Evidence of habit or custom is often admitted as evidence of
conduct on a particular occasion.223 In a prosecution for stealing
the contents of mail, the defendant contended that the letter was
open when it arrived. It was held reversible error to exclude evi-
dence of the habitual arrival of torn mail packages during the two
prior months.224
When a letter has been written and signed in the course of
business and placed in the regular place of mailing, evidence of
the custom of the business organization as to the mailing of such
letters is receivable as evidence that it was duly mailed.225 The
deposit of a letter in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to a
person at his usual place of residence is evidence tending to show
that it reached its destination.226 The customs of the post office may
be shown.227 Telegrams delivered to a door-keeper accustomed to
distribute dispatches to the defendant's office may be- admitted.228
The mode of sending notice to registrants for the draft may be
shown.229 The testimony of a bank cashier as to the custom of mail-
ing letters was admitted.2 30 The custom of affixing air mail stamps
in the regular course of business to letters received by air mail
may be shown.231
The modern cases appear to hold that upon proper evidence
of the habit of an individual commercial house as to addressing and
mailing, the mere execution of a letter in the usual course of busi-
ness may constitute evidence of its later receipt by the person to
223 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 92, 93 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE
§ 162 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 205-07 (1962).
224 Chitwood v. United States, 153 Fed. 551 (8th Cir. 1907).
225 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 95 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 162, at
343 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 206 (1962).
2 2 6 King v. United States, 25 F.2d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1928); Brady v. United
States, 24 F.2d 399, 403 (8th Cir. 1928); United States v. Babcock, 24
Fed. Cas. 909, 910 (No. 14485) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876); United States v.
Weinberger, 4 F. Supp. 892, 902 (D.N.J. 1933).
227Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 494 (1897).
228United States v. Babcock, 24 Fed. Cas. 909, 911 (No. 14485) (C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1876).
229 United States ex rel. Helmecke v. Rice, 281 Fed. 326, 333 (S.D. Tex.
1922).
230 United States v. Decker, 51 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. Md. 1943), citing 1 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 95 (2d ed. 1923, Supp. 1934).
231 United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1943).
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whom it is addressed. In a prosecution for using the mails to de-
fraud, a stenographer's testimony as to the habit of mailing was
held sufficient.232 A court has stated that a "signature of an em-
ployee plus the company's letterhead, together with proof that the
letter was mailed by someone, is sufficient" to show mailing.233
IV. FACT OF OTHER OFFENSES
A. GENERALLY
This discussion would not be complete if it were not pointed
out that evidence of other offenses sometimes comes in at times
other than the presentation of evidence.234 In one case the opening
statement of the government mentioned eighty-three other offenses,
with the aid of a blackboard chart.235 The conviction was reversed.
In the prosecution of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell for tax
evasion, the government stated in its opening statement that it
would prove tax frauds "of far greater magnitude" than those al-
leged in the indictment..2 36 Implied reference to other offenses may
be made in the government's summation. In a prosecution for
using the mails to defraud there was a reversal where the govern-
ment called the defendant a "skunk," "weak-faced weasel," and "a
cheap, scaly, slimy, crook."2 37 In a prosecution for peddling dope, an
accusation of narcotics addiction was held not reversible error be-
cause of a curative instruction..238 News of other offenses may also
reach the jurors through newspapers, magazines, radio, and tele-
vision.239
As early as 1807, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "It is, I believe,
a general rule in criminal prosecutions that a distinct crime for
which a prosecution may be instituted cannot be given in evidence
in order to render it more probable that the particular crime charged
232Alford v. United States, 41 F.2d 157, 160 (9th Cir. 1930). See also
United States v. Vandersee, 279 F.2d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 1960); Cochran v.
United States, 41 F.2d 193, 205 (8th Cir. 1930).
233 Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 125 (9th Cir. 1935).
2 34 See Note, 70 YALE L. J. 763, 782-88 (1961).
235Leonard v. United States, 277 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1960).
236 New York Times, March 10, 1960, p. 1, col. 7.
237 Volkmor v. United States, 13 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1926).
238 Az Din v. United States, 232 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1956).
239Note, 70 YALE L. J. 763, 785-88 (1961). See United States v. Accardo,
298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962), noted 12 Am. U.L. REv. 90, 17 U. MmMI L.
REv. 51; Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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in the indictment was committed. '240 Early American cases relied
on English law.241
In general, there may not be proof of other offenses to show
that the defendant has a general criminal disposition or character
or even a character likely to make him commit the crime for which
he is on trial. 4 2 In a case decided in 1795, in a prosecution for
treason by participation in an insurrection, evidence that the de-
fendant had participated in a robbery of the public mail and that
some of the stolen letters had been read at a meeting of the insur-
rectionists was held inadmissible.243
In one case the trial judge instructed that evidence of similar
offenses "has been permitted to be offered to show, if it does, or
tend to show if it does, and to render it more probable, if in your
findings you believe that it does, that they did appropriate the fire
clay." The Court of Appeals in reversing stated: "The italized
240United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 196 (No. 14694) (C.C.D. Va.
1807). Compare United States v. Tardy, 28 Fed. Cas. 15 (No. 16432)
(C.C.D. Pa. 1817). On proof of other offenses, see 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§§ 192-94 (3d ed. 1940), 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 300-70 (3d ed. 1940);
1 JONES, EVIDENCE 290-94 (5th ed. 1958); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 326-33,
345-46 (1st ed. 1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 213-14(1962); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 492-567 (12th ed. 1955); 1 UNDER-
HILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 447-507 (5th ed. 1956); Stone, The Rule of
Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954
(1933); Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America,
51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938); Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other
Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325 (1956); Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of
Crimes Not Charged in Indictment, 31 ORE. L. REV. 267 (1952); Traut-
man, § 5 VAND L. REV. 385, 403-10 (1952); Note, 29 MICH. L. REV. 473
(1931); Note, 37 MIN. L. REV. 608 (1953); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961);
Note, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1960).
241 Stone, The Rule and Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51
HARV. L. REV. 988, 991-93 (1938). See United States v. Doebler, 25
Fed. Cas. 883, 886 (No. 14977) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832).
2
-12 Massei v. United States, 241 F.2d 895, 902 (1st Cir. 1957); Swann v.
United States, 195 F.2d 689, 690 (4th Cir. 1952); Hargett v. United States,
183 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1950); Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386,
388 (4th Cir. 1948); United States v. Modern Reed & Rattan Co., 159
F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903,
906 (S.D. W. Va. 1944); Coulston v. United States, 51 F.2d 178, 180 (10th
Cir. 1931); Jianole v. United States, 299 Fed. 496, 499 (8th Cir. 1924);
Thompson v. United States, 283 Fed. 895, 896 (3d Cir. 1922); Shea v.
United States, 236 Fed. 97, 104 (6th Cir. 1916); Fish v. United States,
215 Fed. 544, 551 (1st Cir. 1914); Dyar v. United States, 186 Fed. 614,
620 (5th Cir. 1911), citing 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 192 (see 3d ed. 1940).
243 United States v. Mitchell, 26 Fed. Cas. 1282 (No. 15789) (C.C.D. Pa.
1795). See Amnot., 125 A.L.R. 1036, 1040 (1940).
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words are erroneous. It is logical to conclude . . .that because a
man was dishonest he will steal again. It is certainly 'more probable'
that a crooked official did steal than if he were an upright one.
Yet our law forbids these premises. It cannot be shown that the
accused has committed similar crimes to show that it is probable
he committed the one charged." 244
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court stated:
"Courts that follow the common law tradition almost unanimously
have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of
evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a probability
of his guilt. '245 This was not the earlier common law rule, nor is
it now the rule in some civil law countries.
A Court of Appeals reversed because of introduction of evidence
of prior conviction of a similar offense.24 6 The error was not ren-
dered harmless by the defendant's subsequent introduction of
character evidence. It is possible that the defendant would not have
introduced the latter evidence but for the introduction of the evi-
dence of the conviction for the prior offense.
In general, the criminality of the conduct of which evidence
is sought to be introduced is immaterial if it is otherwise relevant ;
47
The character rule is merely an exception. This exception is that
conduct tending and offered to show bad moral character as evi-
dence is inadmissible. 24 8 Furthermore, admissibility for one purpose
is not affected by inadmissibility for another.249 Justice Story, in
speaking about the rule allowing evidence of other wrongs to show
intent, stated: 250
They constitute exceptions to the general rule, excluding evidence
not directly comprehended within the issue; or rather, perhaps,
it may with more certainty be said, the exception is necessarily
24 4Railton v. United States, 127 F.2d 691, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1942). See 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 192 (3d ed. 1940); Notes and Comments, 70 YALE
L.J. 763, 764 (1961).
245 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). The court cited 1
WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 193 (3d ed. 1940).
246 United States v. Modern Reed & Rattan Co., 159 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir.
1947).
247 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 216 (3d ed. 1940); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 305
(3d ed. 1940).
248 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940).
249 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 13 (3d ed. 1940). See Orfield, Admission and
Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases 41 TEXAS L. REV. 617,
638-40 (1963).
250 Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 342, 360 (1842).
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embodied in the very substance of the rule; for whatever does
legally conduce to establish the point in issue is necessarily em-
braced in it, and therefore, a proper subject of proof, whether it
be direct or only presumptive.
Rule 311 of the Model Code of Evidence provides: 251
Subject to Rule 306, evidence that a person committed a crime or
civil wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible as tending to
prove that he committed a crime or civil wrong on another oc-
casion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely as tending to
prove his disposition to commit such a crime or civil wrong or to
commit crimes or civil wrongs generally.
Rule 55 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides:
252
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil
wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposi-
tion to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference
that he committed another crime or civil wrong on another speci-
fied occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is ad-
missible when relevant to prove some other material fact including
absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge or identity.
Judge Bazelon has stated that "the rule is that evidence of
other offenses is admissible when substantially relevant to the
offense charged; inadmissible when its relevance is insignificant;
and, in borderline cases, admissible when its relevance outweighs
-the undue prejudice that may flow from it, but otherwise inad-
missible.', 253
Judge Goodrich has stated a rule favorable to evidence of other
offenses in very broad terms: "Evidence of other offenses may be
received if relevant for any purpose other than to show a mere
propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit
the crime. '254
B. EXCEPTIONS
At an earlier time there had been a tendency to hold evidence
of other offenses not admissible unless it came within a list of ex-
251 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 311 (1942).
252 UNiFoRmV RULE OF EVIDENCE 55.
253 Harper v. United States, 239 F.2d 945, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The court
cited Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America,
51 HARv. L. REV. 988 (1938); Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes
Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 ORE. L. REV. 267 (1952).
254 United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1958). See also United
States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1959); Swann v. United States,
195 F.2d 689, 690 (4th Cir. 1952); Notes and Comments, 70 YALE L.J.
763, 767 (1961).
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ceptions. 25 5 In 1868, Justice Field had stated: "The case of fraud ...
is among the few exceptions to the general rule that other offenses
of the accused are not relevant to establish the main charge. '250
Under the old approach of exceptions, evidence relative to some
accepted purposes might be admitted without regard to its prej-
udicial content.257
The fact that the testimony offered as to a murder tended also
to show another murder is not sufficient to exclude it, if it was
otherwise competent.2 58 Where the indictment itself charges two
murders committed at the same date and place, both may be
shown.259 In a prosecution for unlawful abstraction of money from
a bank, relevant evidence is admissible even though it shows other
offenses of the same kind barred by the statute of limitations..2 60
A fact supplying a motive for the crime charged may be shown,
though it may tend to show the defendant guilty of another offense.
Thus it may be shown that one charged with counterfeiting had a
motive to counterfeit as he was an abortionist who needed money
in case of arrest.261 It may be said that there are two classes of
cases as to motive: (1) proof as to different criminal acts which
are explainable as results of the same motive; and, (2) proofs of
other and independent criminal acts which in and of themselves
form the motive for committing the crime now under prosecution.262
In an income tax evasion case, the government may show the
actual income of the defendant by the amount of his expenditures,
including the payment of state fines.2 63 This does not violate the
rule against evidence of other offenses. In a prosecution for
abortion prior acts of abortion were admitted. Judge Holtzoff
255 See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51
HARv. L. REV. 988, 1005 (1938).
256 Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 132, 138-39 (1868). See also Shea v.
United States, 236 Fed. 97, 102 (6th Cir. 1916); Dyar v. United States,
186 Fed. 614, 622 (5th Cir. 1911).
257 Baker v. United States, 227 F.2d 376, 377 (5th Cir. 1955).
258Moore v. United States, 150 U.S. 57, 61 (1893).
259 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 400 (1894).
260 Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1900).
261Thompson v. United States, 144 Fed. 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1906). See also
United States v. Johnson, 254 F.2d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 1958).
262Thompson v. United States, 144 Fed. 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1906). The court
cited 1 WiGMoRE, EViDENCE § 210 (1st ed. 1905) [§ 216 (3d ed. 1940)].
263 United States v. Caserta, 199 F.2d 905, 909 (3d Cir. 1952). The court
cited 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, §§ 215, 216 (3d ed. 1940).
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stated: "While the bare fact that a defendant has committed other
crimes is not in and of itself admissible against him, the fact that
evidence otherwise competent and relevant would also show that
the defendant committed other crimes, is no reason for its exclu-
sion. ' 264 The jury should be cautioned to consider the evidence
only for the competent purpose.265
These other evidential acts need not be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt.266 Judge Charles E. Clark has stated: "The require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a direction to the jury,
not a rule of evidence; it operates on the whole case, and not on
separate bits of evidence each of which need not be so proven; and
it cannot be accorded a quantitative value other than as a general
cautionary admonition. '26 7 But another offense only vaguely evi-
denced may not be shown.26 8
Other offenses may be shown where they are a part of the res
gestae.269 It has been stated broadly that where two distinct of-
fenses are so inseparably connected that the proof of one neces-
sarily involves proof of the other, on prosecution for one offense
evidence proving it should not be excluded because it also proves
the other.270 Attempts to obstruct the administration of justice were
involved. Evidence is admissible "when it corroborates or supple-
264 United States v. Harper, 137 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1956). See also
United States v. Montalvo, 271 F.2d 922, 927 (2d Cir. 1959), citing 1
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 215-16 (3d ed. 1940) and McComvICK, EVIDENCE
§157 at 332 (1954); O'Dell v. United States, 251 F.2d 704, 707 (10th Cir.
1958).
265 Montgomery v. United States, 203 F.2d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1953).
2 6 6 McCoR1VIcK, EVIDENCE 331 (1954).
267 United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 761 (1943).
2 6 8 Fabacher v. United States, 20 F.2d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1927). See Annot., 3
A.L.R. 779, 784 (1919); Note, 3 VAND. L. REV. 779, 788 (1950).
269 United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 906 (1959), citing 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 218 at 719 (3d ed.
1940); Barnes v. United States, 8 F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1925); West v.
United States, 258 Fed. 413, 419 (6th Cir. 1919). See also Lypp v. United
States, 159 F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1947); United States v. Rubenstein,
151 F.2d 915, 918 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945); Carney
v. United States, 79 F.2d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1935); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 306 (3d ed. 1940).
270 McCormick v. United States, 9 F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1925); Astwood v.
United States, 1 F.2d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 1924). See also United States v.
Bucciferro, 274 F.2d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Crowe,
188 F.2d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1951); Schwartz v. United States, 160 F.2d
718, 721 (9th Cir. 1947).
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ments the offense charged. '271 Here the assault was the result of
the substantive offense and threw light on the conspiracy charged
against the defendant.
Judge Parker stated: "To bring evidence of other offenses
within this rule, the test is not whether they have certain elements
in common with the crime charged, but whether they tend to estab-
lish a preconceived plan which resulted in the commission of that
crime., 272
A leading opinion by Judge Learned Hand allows an exception
to show by similar acts or incidents that the act on trial was not
without guilty knowledge. In a prosecution for knowingly trans-
porting a stolen car in interstate commerce, evidence of a previous
sale of a stolen car is admissible.273 Likewise other offenses may
be shown to prove that the act on trial was not unintentional. The
trial judge has a wide range of discretion in deciding whether the
probative value justifies admission. In one case, the Court of Ap-
peals declined to reverse although it thought that evidence of
offenses committed six years before might better have been ex-
cluded.7 4 It has been held that subsequent as well as prior acts
are admissible for this purpose.275
271 Rodriguez v. United States, 284 F.2d 863, 867 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 1001 (1962).
272 Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 1948). The court
cited 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 300 (2d ed. 1923).
273 United States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 654 (1936).
Judge Hand stated that "the argument [for exclusion] is based on
the doctrine . . . that evidence of the receipt of other stolen goods is
not admissible unless the prosecution proves that the accused knew
them to have been stolen. At least in this circuit there is no such doc-
trine .... [T~he competence of such evidence does not depend upon
conformity with any fixed conditions, such as upon direct proof of
scienter, or the identity of the thief in the earlier instance, or of the
victim, or the number of instances in which the accused received stolen
goods, or the similarity of the goods stolen. These are all relevant
circumstances but not necessary constituents. Nor can we see any basis
for distinguishing between knowledge and intent in such cases. Thejudge must decide each time whether the other instance or instances
form a basis for sound inference as to the guilty knowledge of the
accused in the transaction under inquiry; that is all that can be said
about the matter."
274 United States v. Feldman, 136 F.2d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 1943). (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
275 Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544, 551 (6th Cir. 1944).
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In 1842, Mr. Justice Story stated for the Supreme Court that
"where the intent of the party is matter in issue, it has always
been deemed allowable, as well in criminal as in civil cases, to
introduce evidence of other acts and doings of the party of a kindred
character, in order to illustrate or establish his intent or motive
in the particular act directly in judgment. '276 The rule had been
early applied in cases of uttering bad money and spurious notes, con-
spiracy and perjury.
In one case the court, in reversing a conviction, said: 277
We think, however, that such similar acts can be proved only
when they were done sufficiently near, in point of time, to the act
charged as fairly to throw some light upon the question of intent;
when the similar act is so related in kind to the one charged as to
illustrate the question of intent; when the similar acts are in
fact acts of the same general nature related to the transactions
out of which the alleged criminal acts arose; and, when, in fact,
the similar acts are acts of the persons against whom that par-
ticular proof is directed.
The issue of nearness in time is largely in the discretion of the
trial court,278 but the evidence of the other offense must be plain,
clear and conclusive.279 Thus evidence of arrest for a similar of-
fense in another district, where there was no indictment, is ad-
missible. When showing intent the other offenses may be prior in
time or subsequent.2 0 But as to knowledge, the other acts must
276 Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 360 (1842). See also Mr.
Justice Story's decision in Bottomley v. United States, 3 Fed. Cas. 968,
971 (No. 1688) (C.C.D. Mass. 1840), cited favorably in New York Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 599 (1886).
277 Prettyman v. United States, 180 Fed. 30, 36 (6th Cir. 1910). The court
cited 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 302 (1st. ed. 1904). See also Sutherland v.
United States, 92 F. 2d 305, 308 (4th Cir. 1937).
278 Orloff v. United States, 153 F.2d 292, 294 (6th Cir. 1946) (15 years not
too long); Kettenbach v. United States, 202 Fed. 377, 383 (9th Cir.
1913), cert. denied, 229 U. S. 613 (1913); Schultz v. United States, 200
Fed. 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1912); Walsh v. United States, 174 Fed. 615 (7th
Cir. 1909) (12 years not too long).
279 Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, 802 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Gart v. United
States, 294 Fed. 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1923); Paris v. United States, 260 Fed.
529, 531 (8th Cir. 1919); United States v. Cohen, 73 F. Supp. 96, 100
(W.D. Pa. 1947).
280Waller v. United States, 177 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1949); Shreve v.
United States, 103 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1939).
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be prior in time.2 8 1 According to one case,28 2 remoteness concerns
the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. Prior acts,
not offenses when committed, are not admissible to prove intent.28 3
The rule as to intent should not be extended.284 While evidence
of other offenses is allowed to meet the presumption of accident or
mistake in connection with intent it should not be allowed for
other purposes. Evidence of other offenses is not needed in the
case of a scheme to defraud. Where evidence of other offenses is
admitted to show intent, the jury should be instructed as to the
probative extent of the evidence so admitted.2 85 However, there is
authority that in the absence of request no instruction need be
given.28 6
Dean Wigmore has stated: 28 7
It is not here necessary to look for a general scheme or to discover
a united system in all the acts; the attempt is merely to discover
the intent accompanying the act in question; and the prior doing
of other similar acts, whether clearly a part of the scheme or not,
is useful as reducing the possibility that the act in question was
done with innocent intent.
This language was quoted favorably in United States v. Shiller.288
In 1949, the Supreme Court held on a prosecution for filing
false invoices with an agency of the United States, evidence of the
presentation of false invoices other than those charged, in the in-
dictment is admissible on the issue of intent.28 9
In 1958, the Third Circuit held: "The law is well settled that
prior and subsequent acts whether they portray criminality or not
281 Waller v. United States, 177 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1949); Witters v.
United States, 106 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1939); see Slough & Knightly,
Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325, 329 (1956); Notes, 37
MIN. L. REV. 608, 610 (1953); 25 VA. L. REV. 234 (1938).
282 Holt v. United States, 42 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1930). See Note, 29
MIcH. L. REV. 473, 481 (1931).
2 83 Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795, 806-07 (7th Cir. 1920).
284 Marshall v. United States, 197 Fed. 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1912) ; see Grantello
v. United States, 3 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir. 1924); Erber v. United States,
234 Fed. 221, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1916).
285 Orloff v. United States, 153 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 1946); Tedesco v.
United States, 118 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1941).
286 Smith v. United States, 173 F.2d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1949).
287 2 WIGOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 302, at 200 (3d ed. 1940).
288 187 F.2d 572, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1951).
2 89 Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949). The court cited 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 302-04 (3d ed. 1940).
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when substantially similar to the subject matter forming the basis
of the indictment are probative to negate the inference that the
crucial conduct was unintentional, innocent, inadvertent or the
product of mistake. '290 It must be shown that the prior acts are
sufficiently similar to allow for some probative value.29 1 Much is
left to the discretion of the trial judge,29 2 and Wigmore observes
that: "It is hopeless to attempt to reconcile the precedents under
the various heads; for too much depends on the tendency of the
Court in dealing with a flexible principle. 2 9
3
In a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the narcotics act, a
prior conviction could be shown. The court stated that "it would
seem that evidence of the prior conviction had a distinct probative
value in that it tended to negative innocence of motive or intent. '294
Thus anonymous intent may be shown by proof of other offenses.
Evidence of other offenses to show intent "is to be distinguished
from evidence introduced to establish design or system which is
usually involved when the very doing of the fact charged is still
to be proved. '295 There is "a sharp distinction between the require-
ments for showing intent and those for showing scheme or plan. '299
The trial judge should pass on the offer of evidence beforehand
to see whether it satisfies the proper test.
Wigmore states as to the theory of evidencing design or sys-
tem: 297
The clue to the difference is best gained by remembering that in
the one class of cases the act charged is assumed to be done, and
2 90United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135, 157 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 906 (1959). The court cited McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE 328-31, 345
(1954); 2 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 302, 305, 316, 321 (3d ed. 1940); 51
HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938).
291 Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325, 328
(1956).
292 Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544, 551 (6th Cir. 1944); United
States v. Feldman, 136 F.2d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 1943), aff'd, 322 U.S. 487
(1944).
293 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 302, at 201 (3d ed. 1940). See United States v.
Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 n.6 (3d Cir. 1958).
294 Enriquez v. United States, 188 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1951). The court
cited 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 302, 303 (3d ed. 1940).
295 United States v. Bridell, 180 F. Supp. 268, 273 (N.D. Ill. 1960). The court
cited 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENC E § 302, at 196-205 (3d ed. 1940).
296 United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 1948). The court
quoted 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304, at 302 (3d ed. 1940).
297 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304, at 204 (3d ed. 1940). See Harper v. United
States, 239 F.2d 945, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
RELEVANCY IN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
the mind asks only for something that will negative innocent intent;
and the mere prior occurrence of an act similar in its gross features,
i.e., the same doer and the same sort of act, but not necessarily
the same mode of acting nor the same sufferer-may suffice for
that purpose. But where the very act is the object of proof, and is
desired to be inferred from a plan or system, the combination of
common features that will suggest a common plan as their explana-
tion involves so much higher a grade of similarity as to constitute
a substantially new and distinct test.
Where a defendant was indicted for murder, and it appeared
in evidence that the killing followed an attempt to rob, the lower
court admitted over objection evidence tending to show that the
defendant had committed other robberies in that neighborhood
on different days, shortly before the killing took place. 98 The
Supreme Court held that the evidence was inadmissible for any
purpose.2 9 Other cases have admitted evidence of other offenses
to show identity.3° 0 Of course, if identity is in fact not in issue, the
evidence should not come in.301 Where there is doubt that proof
of the other offense will show identity, such proof should be
excluded.3 02 And when admitted proof of the other offenses should
be clear and definite.
Only in exceptional cases may proof of other offenses be ad-
mitted. Such proof30 3
[is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to
establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or
accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission
of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one
tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged
with the commission of the crime on trial.
298 United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851, 869 (W.D. Ark. 1890); see McCoMvicK,
EVIDENCE 330-31 (1954); Note, 29 MIIcH. L. REV. 473, 477 (1931); Slough &
Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325, 330 (1956).
299 Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 454 (1890) ; accord, United States v.
Magee, 261 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1958); Sorenson v. United States, 168
Fed. 785, 794 (8th Cir. 1909).
300 Dean v. United States, 246 Fed. 568, 574 (5th Cir. 1917) (but the de-
fendant did not object properly). See also Smith v. United States, 173
F.2d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1949).
301 Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948).
302 Labiosa v. Government of Canal Zone, 198 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1952).
303 People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 294, (1901). This case was
quoted favorably in Burge v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 524, 536 (D.C.
Cir. 1906); United States v. Harper, 137 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1956).
See McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 327 n.2 (1954); Stone, The Rule of
Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv. L. REV. 988,
1023-30 (1938).
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In another case the court listed the following exceptions: (1) to
prove intent; (2) to explain, illustrate, or characterize the act
charged when such act is capable of more than one construction; (3)
to rebut a claim of mistake or inadvertence; (4) where the crime is
one of a series of swindles, or where the crime charged is part of a
plan or system of criminal action.30 4
One exception allowing proof of other offenses is proving other
like crimes by the defendant so nearly identical in method as to
earmark them as the handiwork of the defendant. 30 Another
exception is admissions by conduct intended to obstruct justice.30 6
For example, it may be shown that the defendant before trial
assaulted a witness who stated his intention to tell the truth.307
Also, evidence of other offenses may come in when the defendant
takes the stand as a witness, by proof of his convictions of crime
or by eliciting on cross-examination of the defendant his admissions
as to other crimes or misconduct reflecting on his credibility.308
C. JUIicIAL DISCRETION & HARMLEss ERROR
Some decisions call for a balancing of considerations and stress
the element of discretion.30 9 In one case, the Court of Appeals re-
ferred to discretion as a reason for affirming the trial judge's
admitting evidence of other offenses. 310 But there is grave danger
304 Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 682-88 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 687 (1941). The discussion is only full. See also Smith v. United
States, 173 F.2d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1949).
3 0 5Coulston v. United States, 51 F.2d 178, 180 n.1 (10th Cir. 1931). See
McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 328 (1954); Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1006; Note,
70 YALE L.J. 763, 764 (1961); Note, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 131, 136 (1947).
30G MCCORVIICK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 330 (1954).
3 0 7 Hass v. United States, 31 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1929).
308 See Orfield, Impeachment and Support of Witnesses in Federal Criminal
Cases, 11 KAN. L. REV. 447, 460-70 (1963); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 157,
at 331 (1954); Note, 37 MmN. L. REV. 608, 616-17 (1953); Note, 70 YALE
L.J. 763, 774-78 (1961).
3 09Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1942), quoting 29
MICH. L. REV. 473, 480 (1931). See United States v. Montalvo, 271 F.2d
922, 927 (2d Cir. 1959), citing McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 332 (1954).
310 Neff v. United States, 105 F.2d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 1939) (prosecution was
for violation of the Mann Act). In King v. United States, 144 F.2d 729,
732 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 854 (1944), remoteness in time
was said to be in the trial judge's discretion, but similarity of the other
offense would be determined on appeal from the record.
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of unfairness where the discretion is exercised against the defendant
so as to admit the evidence.3 11
If the incidental risk of prejudice in the minds of the jury is
very great, and if the situation indicates hope by the government
that its ulterior possibilities will seize the front of the stage, the
evidence should be excluded. Thus, the government failed to
justify the use of evidence that the defendant had been imprisoned
by arguing that this tended to establish his personal ignorance of
certain material events. 12 It made no difference that the defendant
later went on the stand and testified to the fact; as he might not
have taken the stand but for this evidence. In a prosecution for
robbery committed in a house of prostitution, it was error to allow
testimony that the defendant had been engaged in keeping a house
of prostitution; nor was the error cured by an instruction that such
testimony was to be considered only as explaining the presence
of the witness in the defendant's house at the time involved.313
Such an explanation was neither necessary nor relevant, and the
fact of the presence of the witness was not denied.
In an income tax prosecution, evidence of violation of OPA
regulations is inadmissible where such proof would tend to create
hostility and confusion of issues which far outweigh its value in
proving the offense charged.314
The government is not precluded from showing another offense
by the fact that the defendant has been indicted for it, if such other
offense could otherwise be shown.3 15 Asking a co-defendant whether
he had committed other offenses is not reversible error where
defendant's objection was sustained and the jury was warned to
imply nothing from the question.316
In a prosecution for income tax evasion, admitting evidence
of the defendant's conviction for possession of opium based on a
3 1 1 
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 332 (1954). See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 763,
769 (1961).
3 12 McLendon v. United States, 13 F.2d 777, 778 (6th Cir. 1926).
313 Robinson v. United States, 18 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
314 United States v. Klein, 131 F. Supp. 807, 809, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The
court cited 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 616 (2d ed. 1923); WIGmORE, CODE OP
EVIDENCE, RuLE 11, and reviewed many federal cases. See Note, 70
YALE L.J. 763 n.2 (1961); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940).
31SWitters v. United States, 106 F.2d 837, 838, (D.C. Cir. 1939). See cases
cited at 125 A.L.R. 1037 (1940).
316 Whitaker v. United States, 5 F.2d 546 (Ith Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269
U.S. 569 (1925).
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statement made to a federal agent was prejudicial error, although
the defendant made no objection at the time but later moved to
strike. The motion was overruled, and no cautionary instruction
was given.317 Admission cannot be justified on the basis that the
statement covered both the offense charged and other offenses and
that the two could not be segregated.
The rule against admission of other offenses applies whether
the evidence is elicited from a government witness or from the
defendant himself.318 If the defendant takes the stand, he may be
questioned as to other offenses to affect credibility, but not to prove
the offense charged. In addition, defendant cannot complain of
redirect examination affecting other offenses where he himself
first brought out the matter on cross-examination.3 1 9
Error in permitting proof of other offenses may sometimes be
cured by instruction by the trial judge to disregard such evidence.3 20
But some defense attorneys prefer to have no instruction on such
evidence, fearful that a judicial reminder will arouse the memory
of the jurors, and give the evidence still more weight.3 2 1 In some
cases when it is apparent that the error is not curable, the appellate
court will reverse despite the instructions.3 22 The error may be so
serious that neither striking out the evidence nor instructing the
jury to disregard will cure the error.323
It has been held that evidence of other offenses is not reversi-
ble error when the evidence of the guilt of the defendant is strong,3 24
or if the jury could not have reached any other verdict. Thus, a
court of appeals was unwilling to reverse although evidence of
similar unconnected schemes to defraud by use of the mails was
introduced.3 25
317 Sang Soon Sur v. United States, 167 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1948).
318 Weiner v. United States, 20 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1927).
319 Casmano v. United States, 13 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1926). See O'Neal v.
United States, 240 F.2d 700, 702 (10th Cir. 1957).
320 Heglin v. United States, 27 F.2d 310, 313 (8th Cir. 1928); Barnes v. United
States, 8 F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1925). Compare Note, 70 YALE L.J.
763, 765 (1961).
321 United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928, 932 n.2 (2d Cir. 1952).
322 Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892).
323 Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1955).
324 Whitaker v. United States, 5 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1925, cert. denied,
269 U.S. 569 (1925); see Heglin v. United States, 27 F.2d 310, 313 (8th
Cir. 1928); Ryan v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 74, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1905).
325 United States v. Shurtleff, 43 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1930). See Note,
29 MICH. L. REV. 473, 481 (1931).
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Where the fact of arrest of the defendant for another offense
was inadvertently brought out, incidental to an attempt by the
witness to fix the date of a certain event, there is no prejudicial
error.326 Where a government witness on cross-examination by the
defendant reveals the commission of an offense fifteen years pre-
viously there is no reversible error.3 27
In some cases, proof of other offenses may be harmless error
where trial is by the court without a jury, but not if before a jury.32s
The statute of limitations does not apply to evidence produced
in support of an indictment. "Evidence of a prior offense, though
barred by the statute of limitations, may be used to prove intent,
motive, state of mind, etc., of the crime charged."3 29
V. THE PARTICULAR CRIME
That the test of relevancy is not standard in its application
should by now be apparent to the reader. While the general ap-
proach remains the same, it now becomes necessary to examine




In a prosecution for passing counterfeit notes, evidence may
be given of the defendant's passing similar counterfeit notes in
order to prove his knowledge that the note in question was a coun-
terfeit.330 But if the indictment is for passing a counterfeit note of
the Bank of the United States, evidence of passing a counterfeit
note of another bank, at another time, is not admissible; and, if
326 Berra v. United States, 221 F.2d 590, 595 (8th Cir. 1955).
327United States v. Apuzzo, 245 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1957).
328Smith v. United States, 224 F.2d 58, 61 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 885 (1955).
329 United States v. Anzalone, 100 F.Supp. 987, 989-90 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1951)
citing many cases), rev'd on other grounds, 197 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1952).
See also United States v. Hougendobler, 218 Fed. 187 (E.D. Pa. 1914);
Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1900); Dow v. United
States, 82 Fed. 904, 909 (8th Cir. 1897).
330 York v. United States, 241 Fed. 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1916); Schultz v.
United States, 200 Fed. 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1912); United States v. Rouden-
bush, 27 Fed. Cas. 902, 903 (No. 16198) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832); United States
v. Doebler, 25 Fed. Cas. 883, 887 (No. 14977) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1932).
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received without objection by the defendant the jury will be in-
structed not to consider it.
3 31
The former article must have some similarity to the one in
question. 32 The passing of the other article may have occurred
before or after the one in question.333 In an indictment for uttering
counterfeit coins, possession of other coins is admissible.334 In an
indictment for uttering counterfeit five cent pieces, possession
of a mold for counterfeit twenty-five cent pieces was admitted to
show intent.335 In a prosecution for passing counterfeit bills, evi-
dence showing the presence of the defendant at other places where
identical bills were passed was held admissible to show intent.3 6
"It is well settled that, in a counterfeiting case, evidence of passing
or.attempting to pass similar counterfeit notes on other occasions
is admissible on the question of defendant's intent which is indis-
pensable to proof of the offense. 337 A court has stated that "the
fact that intent is in issue is not enough to let in evidence of similar
acts unless they are 'so connected with the offense charged in part
of time and circumstances as to throw light upon the intent: ,,338
No fixed rule determines the length of time.339 Evidence tending
to prove that the defendant became interested in counterfeiting
some three years before the present charge is admissible "within
the discretion of the trial judge. '340
331 United States v. Roudenbush, 27 Fed. Cas. 902, 903 (No. 16198) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1832).
332 United States v. Roudenbush, 27 Fed. Cas. 902, 903 (No. 16198) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1832); United States v. Doebler, 25 Fed. Cas. 883, 886 (No. 14977)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832).
."33 United States v. Doebler, 25 Fed. Cas. 883, 887 (No. 14977) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1832).
334United States v. Burns, 24 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1314 (No. 14691) (C.C.D.
Ohio 1849). See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 311-13 (3d ed. 1940).
335 Bryan v. United States, 133 Fed. 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1904).
336 Carrull v. United States, 184 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1950).
337 United States v. Leitner, 202 F. Supp. 688, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Note, 70
YALE L.J. 763, 767 (1961). The court cited 2 WimVoRm, EVIDENCE §§ 309,
312 (3d ed. 1940).
33 8 Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; accord, Wolcher
v. United States, 200 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 822 (1955).
339 Mitchell v. United States, 213 F.2d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 912. The court cited 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 316(2) (3d ed.
1940).
340 United States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950). The court cited
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 316(2) (3d ed. 1940).
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2. Forgery
In an indictment for forgery, scienter may be proved by the fact
of similar forged orders found in the possession of the defendant.341
Obtaining money by a deed of trust on property gotten shortly
before by a forged deed is admissible to show the intent in a
prosecution for forging the deed.342 In a prosecution for forgery
of Chinese immigrant duplicate certificates, other forged duplicate
certificates were admitted to show intent.343 In a prosecution for
forgery of a pension check indorsement, forged vouchers were
admitted as showing a "single scheme to defraud." They were
admissible "to prove the guilty intent and knowledge with which
the principal acts charged were done. 3 44
3. Embezzlement
Evidence of other false dealings with the same bank was held
admissible to show intent in a prosecution for making false entries
in the books of a national bank.345 In a prosecution for misapplica-
tion of bank funds, instances of similar misapplication for three
years previous was held admissible to show intent.3 4 6 It made no
difference that the statute of limitations had run as to the earlier
offense. In a prosecution for embezzlement and false entries, certain
other false statements were held admissible on intent.347 The court
stated in a prosecution for embezzlement of rationing coupons
that "evidence of other offenses was admissible to show a fraudu-
lent plan, scheme or design beginning with the giving away of a
few coupons, going forward to the suggestion of pay, and moving
logically to the acts in proof here as an integral part of it. ' '348
341 United States v. Hinman, 26 Fed. Cas. 324, 325 (No. 15370) (C.C.D.N.J.
1831).
342United States v. Brooks, 10 D.C. (3 MacArth.) 315, 317 (1879).
343Dillard v. United States, 141 Fed. 303, 308 (9th Cir. 1905); see also Ex
parte Schorer, 197 Fed. 67, 77 (E.D. Wis. 1912), citing 2 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 312 (1st ed. 1904). Contra, Laughlin v. United States, 92 F.2d
506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
344 Withaup v. United States, 127 Fed. 530, 532 (8th Cir. 1903). But see
Laughlin v. United States, 92 F.2d 506, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (dissent
cited 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 315, at 509 (2d ed. 1923); MacDonald v.
United States, 264 Fed. 733, 740 (1st Cir. 1920) (dissent at 751-52 cited 1
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 300, 304, 315 (1st ed. 1904)).
345 Dorsey v. United States, 101 Fed. 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1900). Judge Sanborn
dissented.
346 Wolfson v. United States, 101 Fed. 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1900).
347 Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 284 (8th Cir. 1932).
348 Henderson v. United States, 143 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1944).
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Where a plan has been shown of diverting bank funds by a certain
method, a varying act, such as diversion in another manner, is not
admissible.349
4. Larceny
Possession of a forged letter was held inadmissible as evidence
in a prosecution for larceny of a trunk.350 In a prosecution for
secreting and stealing mail contents, the defendant's destruction
of mail shortly before by burning was held admissible to show
intent.351 Former possession of another car only vaguely evidenced
was not admissible in a prosecution for theft of a motor vehicle.3 52
But in a prosecution for theft of a motor vehicle, evidence of other
offenses, such as stealing harnesses, is not reversible error where
some of such evidence was not objected to and some was brought
out on direct examination of the defendant and cross-examination of
a witness. The offenses were interwoven, numerous cautions as
to the evidence were given, and the evidence of guilt was over-
whelming.353 Evidence of stealing other horses is admissible where
defendant is being prosecuted for stealing horses.354 Where the
defendant was charged with theft because he became a party to
the theft by acting as a lookout, and the defendant denied that he
knew what the other parties were doing, evidence of other like
activities of the defendant was admissible to show the defendant's
knowledge and intent.355 A subsequent transaction has been ad-
mitted to show intent. 56
5. Robbery
Other similar prior assaults were admitted to show intent in
a prosecution for assault with intent to rob.357 In a prosecution for
robbery, a prior solicitation for help to rob the same man was ad-
349 Flood v. United States, 36 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1929). See 29 MIcH.
L. Rsv. 473, 479 (1931).
350 Ryan v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 74, 83 (1905).
35' Chitwood v. United States, 153 Fed. 551, 553 (8th Cir. 1907). Judge
Sanborn, concurring in the result, thought it was error to receive in
evidence testimony relative to burning of mail.
3 52 Fabacher v. United States, 20 F.2d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1927).
3 53 Heglin v. United States, 27 F.2d 310, 313 (8th Cir. 1928).
354 Tinsley v. United States, 43 F.2d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 1930).
355 United States v. Platt, 156 F.2d 326, 327 (7th Cir. 1946). The court cited
2 WiooE, EviDENCE § 346 (3d ed. 1940).
356 Waller v. United States, 177 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1949).
357 Weathers v. United States, 269 Fed. 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1921).
RELEVANCY IN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
missible.38 The evidence tended to prove the defendant's "plan,
purpose, and intent." In a prosecution for robbery at a house of
prostitution, testimony that for half a year women had lured other
men to the defendant's house of prostitution for robbery in collusion
with the defendant was held inadmissible.359 In a prosecution for
armed bank robbery occurring in South Bend, Indiana, it was re-
versible error to admit evidence that on two prior occasions the
defendant had robbed a bank in Cicero, Illinois. 60
6. Burglary
Evidence of a prior bank robbery may be admitted where the
crime charged is burglary of a post office.361 Defendant's counsel
had brought out the fact on cross-examination. Cautioning the jury
would avoid any prejudice.
7. Extortion
In a prosecution for receiving money under threat of inform-
ing, similar offenses were not admitted as intent was not in issue.362
A subsequent attempt two years later to blackmail the victim was
held admissible in an attempted extortion prosecution.363 Testimony
as to a similar act subsequently committed is admissible to show
"intent, plan or scheme. '364
8. Knowing Possession or Receipt of Stolen Goods
To prove knowledge that the goods in question were stolen,
it may be shown that at other times the defendant received stolen
goods from the same person.3 5
Intent and knowing receipt of shoes stolen from a railway
car can be proven by showing possession of other shoes stolen
from cars at the same station.366 The essence of the offense is guilty
knowledge. Such knowledge may be shown by competent, though
358 Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
359 Robinson v. United States, 18 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
360 United States v. Magee, 261 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1958).
361 Kanner v. United States, 34 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1929).
362 Farkas v. United States, 2 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 1924).
363 United States v. Blount, 229 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1956). The court cited
2 WimGORE, EVIDENCE § 352 (3d ed. 1940).
364 United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 577 (3d Cir. 1958).
365 Sapir v. United States, 174 Fed. 219, 221 (2d Cir. 1909); New York Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 599 (1886); Bottomley v. United
States, 3 Fed. Cas. 968, 971 (No. 1688) (C.C.D. Mass. 1840).
366 Degnan v. United States, 271 Fed. 291, 293 (2d Cir. 1921).
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circumstantial, evidence. 367 In a prosecution for knowing possession
of stolen cloth, evidence of possession of stolen bonds was excluded
on the facts.368 The receipt of the bonds occurred almost two years
after the offense charged. However, evidence of different stolen
goods has been admitted.369 In a prosecution for receiving property
stolen from the mails, admission of evidence of thefts from the
mint and from a bank was not error, where it was inseparably
interwoven with the offense charged and tended to prove intent,
knowledge, and existence of a conspiracy.370 Casmano v. United
States,371 wrongly held that evidence of receipt of other goods
stolen from the same place was not admissible. In a prosecution
for receiving 2,000 dollars in currency, receipt of another stolen
400 dollars from the same parties was held admissible to show
knowledge and intent.3 7 2
In these cases there should be no hard and fast requirement
that it be proved that the defendant knew that the other property
was stolen,373 although it has been held otherwise.374 Likewise,
receiving similar stolen goods after the offense for which he is
being tried will not be admitted to show knowledge earlier.375
Evidence tending to show that the defendant had committed
the state crime of buying stolen property was admitted to show
intent and knowledge under the National Stolen Property Act.37 6
In a prosecution for knowingly transporting stolen motor vehicles
in commerce, evidence of a prior trip was admitted.
3 77
367 Kasle v. United States, 233 Fed. 878, 888-90 (6th Cir. 1916).
368 Wolf v. United States, 290 Fed. 738, 745 (2d Cir. 1923).
369 Nakutin v. United States, 8 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1925).
370 McCormick v. United States, 9 F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir. 1925).
371 13 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1926). But there was no reversal because the
defendant failed to except and because the defendant himself first raised
the issue on cross-examination.
372 Johnston v. United States, 22 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1927).
373 United States v. Antrobus, 191 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1951). See United
States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1935); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §
157, at 329 n.13 (1954).
374 Edwards v. United States, 18 F.2d 402, 404 (8th Cir. 1927). See McKusick,
Techniques in Proof of Other Crimes to Show Guilty Knowledge and
Intent, 24 IowA L. REV. 471, 475 (1939). See also Niederluecke v. United
States, 21 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1927).
375 Witters v. United States, 106 F.2d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1939). One judge
would admit the evidence. He cited 1 WIGmOnE, EVIDENCE § 325 (3d ed.
1940). See 25 VA. L. REv. 234 (1938).
376 Kowalchuk v. United States, 176 F.2d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 1949).
377 United States v. Antrobus, 191 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1951).
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B. FRAUD CRIMES
1. False Representations
It is not competent, in a prosecution for obtaining money under
false pretenses, to admit evidence that the defendant had pre-
viously obtained money by means of other false representations.3 8
But it is competent to show that he had made previous false rep-
resentations to others for the purpose of obtaining money from
them.
Evidence of similar transactions at a previous time is relevant
in a prosecution for using the mails to defraud. But this evidence
is relevant only in so far as it goes to prove the intent.379 In a
prosecution for false certification of checks by a bank president
knowing the account to be deficient, prior approval of illegal stock
speculations of the cashier by the defendant was admitted to show
intent.880 In a prosecution for a false report to the comptroller by
the president of a national bank, previous false reports were ad-
mitted to show intent.38' Similar false representations to another
person were admitted in a prosecution for false pretenses as to a
stock guaranty.382 In a prosecution for false pretenses based on
forged deeds caused to be recorded, similar false records in another
county were admitted to show intent and a general scheme to de-
fraud.38 3 Where the defendant was charged with conspiracy and
using the mails to defraud, a fraud similar to that charged, com-
mitted by the defendant and a third conspirator, was admitted
against the defendant "to prove his fraudulent purpose toward the
victim."38 4 But in a prosecution for false pretenses, testimony as
to similar representations made two years before was excluded.88
Such representations did not show knowledge or intent. Evidence
that the defendant on another occasion agreed to sell a similarly
fraudulent export declaration was admitted to show "design and
intent" in a prosecution for false and fraudulent statements in ship-
378Waight v. United States, 28 Fed. Cas. 1337 (No. 17042) (C.C.D.C. 1844).
379 United States v. Flemming, 18 Fed. 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1883).
3s0 Spurr v. United States, 87 Fed. 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1898).
381 Bacon v. United States, 97 Fed. 35, 41 (8th Cir. 1899).
382 Partridge v. United States, 39 App. D.C. 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
38 3 MacKnight v. United States, 263 Fed. 832, 838 (1st Cir. 1920).
384 United States v. Reiburn, 127 F.2d 525, 526 (2d Cir. 1942); see also Allen
v. United States, 289 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1961).
385 Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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pers' export declaration. 3 6 In a prosecution for income tax evasion
"evidence of collateral, similar or connected conduct with reference
to his income tax is admissible to show his intention. '38 7
The government was not permitted to show, in a prosecution
for using the mails to defraud by false representations as to medical
skill and eminence, that the defendant had been convicted three
times of various offenses in the United States and other times in
England.3s8 But, on principle, the government should have been per-
mitted to prove the falsity of the representations by showing that
the life of the defendant had been otherwise.38 9
Wigmore has noted: 3 90
Knowledge of the falsity of the other representatives need not be
shown . . . . It is the mere recurrence of similar incorrect (not
necessarily false) representations which leads to the belief that
they could not have been made innocently; we may assume that
any given one might have been innocent, but cannot concede this
when we notice the recurrence.
In a prosecution for use of the mails to defraud by bogus
setting on a pretended turf exchange, it was held that other similar
fraud by the defendants at another fake turf exchange was ad-
missible to show knowledge and intent. But not an unrelated fraud
by the defendants involving stock transactions was inadmissible.391
Defendant, in a trial for conspiracy to defraud the United States
by the use of counterfeits of the stamping devices used by the
government inspectors, denied all knowledge that the counterfeit
stamps had been procured or used. Evidence that he placed a gov-
ernment inspector at the factory under a previous contract on the
factory payroll under an assumed name was not admissible. The
evidence did not tend to show his knowledge that the counterfeit
stamps were procured and used, and the question was not whether
386 United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 852 (2d Cir. 1951), citing 2
WIGMOmE, EVIDENCE §§ 301, 304 (3d ed. 1940); 3 VAND L. REV. 779 (1950).
387 United States v. Bridell, 180 F. Supp. 268, 273 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
388 Dyar v. United States, 186 Fed. 614, 620 (5th Cir. 1911).
389 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 321, at 220 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
390 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 321, at 227 (3d ed. 1940). See Green v. United
States, 188 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
391 Shea v. United States, 236 F.2d 97, 102 (6th Cir. 1916). See McCoRMIcK,
EVIDENCE § 164, at 345 (1954). The other representations must be shown
to be false. Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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he had guilty knowledge, but whether he had any knowledge at
all.392
2. Fraudulent Transfers
In a prosecution of a bankrupt for falsely scheduling and con-
cealing assets, evidence of sham conveyances by the bankrupt and
his wife to third parties was admissible to show a fraudulent pur-
pose to defeat creditors.393 But in this case the evidence was with-
drawn. Similarly, concealment of other property was admitted in
a prosecution for concealment of a bankrupt's estate. 39 4
3. Sundry Frauds
In an information for forfeiture for fraudulent undervaluation
of imported goods, the defendant had entered twenty-nine impro-
tations of which the four charged were a part, during the years
1839 to 1840. Fifteen were before and ten after the four charged.
All these invoices were overvalued and all asserted an exporter's
discount which was not given. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Story, admitted "other acts and doings of the party of a
kindred character, in order to illustrate or establish his intent or
motive in the particular act."39 The Court stated that the principle
applied in criminal cases as well as civil.
In a prosecution for making a false income tax return, evidence
of failure to file a tax return for the preceding year is admissible
to prove intent to defraud the government.39 False reports to the
United States Comptroller seven years previously were admitted
in a prosecution for false entry by a bank officer.3 97 Again the
period of time of the earlier offenses is largely discretionary with
the trial judge. In a prosecution for failing to furnish the Collector
392 MacDonald v. United States, 264 Fed. 733, 738 (1st Cir. 1930). One judge
dissented, asserting that the evidence was admissible as part of one
general plan and in order to show design. MacDonald v. United States,
supra at 740, 751, citing 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 300, 304, 315 (3d ed.
1940).
93Blodgett v. United States, 161 F.2d 47, 51 (8th Cir. 1947). See 2 WIGMOHE,
EVIDENcE §§ 333-38 (3d ed. 1940).
304 Lueders v. United States, 210 Fed. 419, 423 (9th Cir. 1914).
395 Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 360 (1842).
39G United States v. Sullivan, 98 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1938); Emmich v. United
States, 298 Fed. 5, 9 (6th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 608 (1924).
See also Mitchell v. United States, 208 F.2d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 1954);
Leeby v. United States, 192 F.2d 331, 334 (8th Cir. 1951).
397 Kettenbach v. United States, 202 Fed. 377, 383 (9th Cir. 1913).
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of Internal Revenue information as to a partnership, evidence of the
defendant's refusal to furnish prior returns was admitted. 98 But,
in 1962, a court held that admission of the defendant's income tax
returns for prior years, showing substantial income from gambling,
for the asserted purpose of showing motive, intent, or wilful mis-
conduct, was prejudicial error in a prosecution for false statements
in later returns which showed income from a different source. 99
The case had been tried by a jury. If tried by a judge the result
might be different.
40 0
In a prosecution for fraud and bribery of inspectors in perform-
ing a government contract for army shoes, the indictment charged
conspiracy to buy and use outer and inner soles inferior to the con-
tract requirements. Evidence of using inferior middle soles was
admitted to show intent.401
Charged with using the mails to defraud by investment circu-
lars, defendant's solicitations of a similar sort a year previously,
were admitted. 402 In a similar prosecution, various reports of the
defendant were admitted.40 3 In one case similar circulars sent prior
to the offense charged were admitted, but those sent afterwards
were excluded. 404 The same result was reached with regard to the
sale of burial lots through mailed representations to other pur-
chasers. 40 It may be shown that the "same scheme and artifice"
398 Pappas v. United States, 216 F.2d 515, 518 (10th Cir. 1954).
399 United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
400 United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 966 (1955).
401 Sears v. United States, 264 Fed. 257, 262 (1st Cir. 1920). But cf. Mac-
Donald v. United States, 264 Fed. 733, 738 (1st Cir. 1920).
402 Packer v. United States, 106 Fed. 906, 909 (2d Cir. 1901). See also Good-
man v. United States, 273 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 1960), But see Harper v.
United States, 143 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1944); Johnson v. United
States, 82 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1936); United States v. Sprinkle, 57
F.2d 968, 969 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Shurtleff, 43 F.2d 944,
947 (2d Cir. 1930); Kercheval v. United States, 12 F.2d 904, 906 (8th
Cir. 1926); Hallowell v. United States, 253 Fed. 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1918);
Farmer v. United States, 223 Fed. 903, 911 (2d Cir. 1915); Marshall v.
United States, 197 Fed. 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1912), which was not followed
in later cases and overruled in United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564,
566 (2d Cir. 1949).
4 03Balliet v. United States, 129 Fed. 689, 693 (8th Cir. 1904).
404 McLendon v. United States, 13 F.2d 777, 778 (6th Cir. 1926). Wigmore
would admit the latter as well as the former. 2 WIGMORE, EWDENCE §
341 (3d ed. 1940).
405 Osborne v. United States, 17 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1927).
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was afterwards used in another town in the same state.40 In one
case "similar transactions not too remote in time" were admitted.4 7
In a prosecution for using the mails to defraud by sending a pre-
tended remedy for a disease, "evidence of other and similar ven-
tures" by the defendant admitted to show intent.408
In a prosecution for mail fraud in soliciting of funds for an
orphanage, evidence of the defendant's alleged violation of federal
income tax laws and threats of harm to a receiver appointed by a
state court to take charge of the defendant's institution was inad-
missible for any purpose, including a showing of intent to defraud.409
Charged with conspiracy to obtain land grants by fraudulent
homestead claims, other instances of similar fraudulent claims
made by the defendant in connivance with other persons were ad-
mitted.410 Similarily, transactions in another part of the state and
by a different method were admitted.411 In an action for fraudulent
entry of homestead land on old soldiers' rights, similar arrange-
ments with soldiers' widows were held properly admitted to show
knowledge and intent.412 In a prosecution for misbranding medicine,
circulars containing the same statements on the label were ad-
mitted.413 Other prior acts of dishonesty were admitted in a prosecu-
tion for false claims against the government.414 Prior similar offenses
were admitted in a prosecution under the Securities Act of 1933,41r
and in a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States.416
Evidence of similar frauds perpetrated by inducing marriages on
false representations to obtain money from victims, was admitted
to show intent in a prosecution for transporting money in interstate
400 Hatem v. United States, 42 F.2d 40, 41 (4th Cir. 1930). See 29 Mmcn. L.
REv. 473, 474 (1931).
407 Butler v. United States, 53 F.2d 800, 805 (10th Cir. 1931). See also King
v. United States, 144 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1944).
408 Samuels v. United States, 232 Fed. 536, 542 (8th Cir. 1916).
409 Coleman v. United States, 167 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1948).
410 Jones v. United States, 162 Fed. 417, 427 (9th Cir. 1908).
411 Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584, 610 (9th Cir. 1910).
412 Jones v. United States, 258 U.S. 40, 48 (1922).
413 Alberty v. United States, 91 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1937).
414 Roberts v. United States, 137 F.2d 412, 415 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 768 (1943).
415 Harper v. United States, 143 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1944).
4 10 Nye & Nissen Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949). The Court
cited 2 WomoaRE, EviDENCE §§ 302-04 (3d ed. 1940).
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commerce which had been gotten feloniously by fraud.417 In a
prosecution for transportation of a check with intent to defraud,
evidence of other fraudulent conduct was admitted.418
C. CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON
1. Homicide
The government in a murder prosecution may prove an assault
or a contemplated assault on a police officer for the purpose of
escaping.419 In a murder case where there was only one witness,
evidence that the defendant threatened the life of such witness
and made assaults on her some months after the killing was ad-
missible.420 In a prosecution for murder of a police officer, claimed
to have been committed in an effort to escape arrest for two other
murders committed a few hours before, evidence as to the earlier
homicide is admissible.421 Evidence of a former robbery was ad-
mitted to show motive in a prosecution for murder of a police of-
ficer.422
Where a homicide was committed in the presence of three
witnesses, it was held reversible error to permit one of those wit-
nesses to testify that six months later the defendant was very
disagreeable and tried to start a fight with another member of the
party.423 The evidence tended to prove that the defendant was a
dangerous man. In a prosecution for the murder of his wife, the
government could not show that half an hour later he shot his
mother-in-law because the record failed to show "such threats
and declarations as might have made the latter crime reflect light
upon the intent of the appellant in committing the earlier crime., 424
The government could show that the defendant after shooting the
417 United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1949).
418 Miller v. United States, 278 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1960).
419 Bowman v. United States, 267 Fed. 648, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Funk v.
United States, 16 App. D.C. 478, 494 (1900). See also McHenry v. United
States, 276 Fed. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921). See 25 IND. L. J. 64 (1949).
420 Bowman v. United States, 267 Fed. 648, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
421 Copeland v. United States, 2 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
422 Suhay v. United States, 95 F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir. 1938). The defendant
was sentenced to death.
423 Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 356, 360 (1901).
424 Burge v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 524, 537 (1906).
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deceased pursued and shot the sister of the deceased in order to
prove that the first act done was with deliberate intent to kill. 425
In a prosecution for killing the paramour of his wife, where the
defendant pleaded an unsound mind, the government can introduce
evidence of his criminal relations with another woman to show his
mental attitude towards his wife.426
In an English case of murder of a wife by arsenic in February,
an attempt to kill another person by arsenic eight months later was
admitted to negative the defendant's innocent possession of arsenic
in February although the defendant relied on the defense of suicide
rather than accident.427 This case was cited favorably in a decision
of the Second Circuit.428
2. Assault
In a prosecution for perjury arising from a hearing on an in-
junction against a strike with violence, assault on another person
contemporaneously was admitted.429 It had become an issue of fact
whether the defendant had committed an assault. The evidence was
admissible as a part of the res gestae.
3. Sexual Offenses
In a prosecution for assault on a female child aged nine by her
physician, a prior similar instance with another child almost three
years before was held inadmissible.430
It has been held that while evidence of other similar offenses
is admissible to show intent in cases of assault with intent to rape
and crimes involving a depraved sexual instinct, this is not true
as to rape.43 ' In a rape prosecution, where intercourse was admitted
425 Copeland v. United States, 152 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The court cited
1 WIGMORm, EVIDENCE §§ 216-17 (3d ed. 1940). See also Swann v. United
States, 195 F.2d 689, 692 (4th Cir. 1952).
426 Bell v. United States, 210 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 956 (1953).
427 Rex v. Armstrong, 2 K.B. 555 (1922).
428 United States v. Shurtleff, 43 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1930). But the federal
case did not involve homicide.
429 West v. United States, 258 Fed. 413, 419 (6th Cir. 1919).
430 Hall v. United States, 235 Fed. 869, 870 (9th Cir. 1916). One judge dis-
sented. The court cited 2 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 357 (1st ed. 1904). See
40 MlmN. L. REV. 694 (1956).
431 Fairbanks v. United States, 226 F.2d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1955). One judge
dissenting. Compare United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1958); See also Smith v. United States, 173 F.2d 181, 184 (9th Cir.
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and the only issue was that of consent, it is improper to admit evi-
dence of a prior rape on another woman. However, the defendant
by his own testimony may invite proof of other offenses.43 2
In an abortion prosecution, it is not proper to show motive by
showing another abortion, particularly where it appears that the
defendant had been granted a new trial as to such other abortion.433
But, in a subsequent case it was held that where the physician ad-
mitted treating the complaining witness at the time and place
alleged by her and in the manner described by her, but claimed that
the treatment was not designed to cause an abortion, testimony of
two other women that the defendant agreed to and performed an
abortion on each in the same manner and about the same time, is
admissible.43 4 Had the performance of the treatment been in issue,
then the evidence could not have been admissible. One judge
disagreed as to the latter point and would let the evidence in even
then.
One exception to the rule against proof of other offenses is that
allowing such proof to show a propensity of illicit sexual relations
with the particular person concerned in the offense on trial.43 5 It
has been so held as to statutory rape. A later offense may be
shown.436 In a prosecution for statutory rape proof of other offenses
to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
offense now charged was refused where such proof would be doubt-
ful to solve the issue of identity and proof of the other offense was
not clear and definite.43 7 Evidence of other similar offense, where,
offered to prove propensity for illicit sexual relations with a par-
ticular person, is admissible in incest prosecutions. 438
1949) ; Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948), reversing
77 F.Supp. 619 (E.D.S.C. 1948), noted in 22 TEMP. L. Q. 459 (1949). The
decision of secondt rial cout was affirmed, 175 F.2d 312 (1948), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 834 (1948).
432 O'Neal v. United States, 240 F.2d 700, 702 (10th Cir. 1957).
433 Thompson v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 352, 360 (1908).
434 Harper v. United States, 239 F.2d 945, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The court
cited 2 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 304 (3d ed. 1940). A concurring judge cited
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 359 (3d ed. 1940).
4 35 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157, at 328 (1954).
436 Miller v. United States, 207 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See also United
States v. Lovely, 77 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
437 Labiosa v. Government of Canal Zone, 198 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1952).
4 3 8 Hodge v. United States, 126 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See United States
v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 n.9 (3d Cir. 1958), citing Annot., 167 A.L.R.
565 (1947). But cf. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 360 (3d ed. 1940).
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In a prosecution for transporting a woman in interstate com-
merce for prostitution, the testimony of a woman, not the victim,
that the defendant had first employed her as a domestic servant and
shortly thereafter raped her was held incompetent and prejudi-
cial.43 9 In the Fifth Circuit, evidence of other sexual offenses has
been admitted.440 The Ninth Circuit-at first rejected such evi-
dence,441 but later cases admitted it. 442 The Second Circuit held that
evidence of similar activities with the same woman should be ad-
mitted.443 The First Circuit held that testimony of one of the
women involved that the defendant had beaten her was admissible,
as well as pornographic photographs of women not named in the
indictment. 4 4 4 The Eighth Circuit has taken a similar
view.445 Evidence that the defendant stole gasoline for the trip, and
after ridding himself of the girl took another to his room is ad-
missible.446 Evidence tending to show that the defendant engaged
in prostitution is admissible.447 The receipt without objection of
evidence of acts occurring shortly before or after the offense charged
in an indictment for violation of the White Slave Act is not plain
error under Rule 52 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
since such evidence was material as to intent.448
D. PUBLIC WELFARE CRIMS
1. Dealing in Liquors
Where intent is not material, in selling or possessing intoxi-
cating liquors, prior sales are not admissible.44 But admission was
held harmless error as other evidence clearly warranted convic-
439 United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1944). One judge
dissented.
440 Lindsey v. United States, 227 F.2d 113, 117 (5th Cir. 1955); Cohen v.
United States, 120 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1941).
441 Bonness v. United States, 20 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1927).
442 Lawrence v. United States, 162 F.2d 156, 159 (9th Cir. 1947); Bush v.
United States, 267 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1959), citing McCoMicK,
EVIDENcE § 157 (1954).
443 United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1944), citing 2 WiG ons,
Ev _ aC §§ 357, 360 (3d ed. 1940). See also United States v. Ratley, 284
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1960).
444 Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 513 (1st Cir. 1946).
445 Neff v. United States, 105 F.2d 688, 690 (8th Cir. 1939).
446 Kirby v. United States, 160 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1947).
447 United States v. Sorrentino, 79 F. Supp. 425, 430 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
448 Flanagan v. United States, 308 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1962).
449 Carpenter v. United States, 280 Fed. 598, 600 (4th Cir. 1922).
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tion. In a prosecution for transportation, possession of other liquor
was admitted "to negative the claim of accident.1450 Prosecuted
for illegally making liquor, a prior similar offense was admitted to
contradict the defendant's direct testimony that he never worked
at a still.
451
In a prosecution for removing liquor subject to tax, admission
of conviction of a liquor offense ten years before when the de-
fendant was only sixteen years old was reversible error.452 In a
unregistered still prosecution, an instruction that a prior conviction
on a moonshine still charge might be considered "as evidence of a
tendency or predisposition on the part of the defendant to violate
the law" was held erroneous and ground for new trial.453 Evidence
of prior offenses is not admissible in a prosecution for possession
of an unregistered still and untaxed liquor.4 54 The offense did not
involve specific intent. Evidence concerning bribery is inadmissible
in a prosecution for conspiracy to possess intoxicating liquors; as
is evidence of sales of liquor at other times and places. 455
In a prosecution for carrying on the business of a wholesale
liquor dealer without paying a special tax in 1910 and 1911, the
issue was whether the business belonged to the defendant's brother
and the defendant acted only as agent. Four acts of ownership by
the defendant in a prior year, 1909, were held inadmissible.456
A conviction for disorderly conduct was held improperly admitted
in a prosecution for maintaining a public place where liquor was
sold.457 But a prior conviction for the same sort of offense would
have been admissible.
In a prosecution for carrying on the business of a malt retail
liquor dealer, it is reversible error to permit evidence showing that
the defendant was at the time also keeping a bawdy house.458 In
450 Holt v. United States, 42 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1930).
451 Peden v. United States, 54 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1931).
452 Caldwell v. United States, 78 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1935). See also Simpkins
v. United States, 78 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 1935), citing 1 WiGmORE,
EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940); Lynch v. United States, 12 F.2d 193 (4th
Cir. 1926).
453United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903, 906 (S.D. W.Va. 1944).
454 Baker v. United States, 227 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1955).
455 Weil v. United States, 2 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1924).
450 Day v. United States, 220 Fed. 818, 819 (4th Cir. 1915). One judge dis-
sented. See criticism at 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 368, at 292 n.2 (3d ed.
1940).457 Hazelton v. United States, 293 Fed. 384 (9th Cir. 1923).
4 58 Taliaferro v. United States, 213 Fed. 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1914).
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a prosecution for a liquor nuisance, possession of similar liquor at
another time and place was held admissible.459 Cross-examination
as to former convictions for unconnected liquor offenses was held
improper in a prosecution for conspiracy to possess and transport.40
In a conspiracy prosecution to violate the internal revenue laws
by manufacturing non-taxed liquor, evidence of a similar offense
committed fifteen years previous was admissible only as to guilty
knowledge and intent. It was reversible error not to give the de-
fendant's requested instruction to that effect.461
Former sales are admissible in a prosecution for maintaining
a liquor nuisance, even prior to the Volstead Act.462 In a prosecution
for a liquor nuisance, a cab driver's testimony as to the furnishing
by the defendant of liquor to his passengers brought there, was
admitted although it also tended to show prostitution on the
premises.4 3
In a prosecution for removing and concealing contraband whis-
key, where the defendant testified on direct examination that
whiskey had been placed in her automobile by another without her
knowledge, cross-examination of the defendant about recent ar-
rests for whiskey violations was proper on the issue of her knowl-
edge of presence of the whiskey in the automobile. 464
2. Dealing In Drugs
Convictions for similar sales in state courts prior to the date
of the federal statute were admitted in a drug prosecution to show
"state of mind and motive. '4 5 Sales to other persons under similar
circumstances may be admitted to show intent.466 Other sales are
admissible where "there is some real connection between the
459 Basich v. United States, 276 Fed. 290 (9th Cir. 1921). Compare Heitman
v. United States, 5 F.2d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 1925).
460 Jianole v. United States, 299 Fed. 496, 499 (8th Cir. 1924). See also
Crowley v. United States, 8 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1925). But see
Cook v. United States, 28 F.2d 730, 732 (8th Cir. 1928); Means v. United
States, 6 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1925); Rossini v. United States, 6 F.2d
350, 352 (8th Cir. 1925).
461 Orloff v. United States, 153 F.2d 292, 294 (6th Cir. 1946).
462 Carpenter v. United States, 280 Fed. 598, 600 (4th Cir. 1922). See also
Brown v. United States, 6 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1925).
403 Harris v. United States, 13 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1926).
464 Ray v. United States, 255 F.2d 473, 475 (4th Cir. 1958).
465 Wallace v. United States, 243 Fed. 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1917).
466 Thompson v. United States, 258 Fed. 196, 203 (8th Cir. 1919).
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extraneous crime and the crime charged. '467 Sales nine months
before in another district were excluded. 4 8 Where the defendant
was a physician his issuance of prescriptions to a large number
of other persons was admitted.4 9 The defendant's illegal prescrip-
tion of liquor fifteen to twenty-five years previously is not admis-
sible.47 0 The defendant's stealing shortly before of morphine from a
drug store is not admissible.471 Other offenses when admissible, must
first be proved clearly and convincingly.472 Acts prior to the period
named in the indictment are admissible in a prosecution for con-
spiracy.4 7 3 A prior act may be shown to weaken the defendant's
claim of no criminal intent.474
In a prosecution for selling paragoric in violation of the nar-
cotics act, evidence of other sales was admissible.4 7 5 Prosecuted for
concealing drugs, defendant's subsequent transactions were ex-
cluded.476 Evidence of previous possession is admissible in a prose-
cution for possession of marihuana. 477
In a prosecution for selling narcotic drugs, evidence of similar
subsequent acts was held admissible.478 In a prosecution for sale
of heroin, evidence of a prior transaction was admitted to show
intent, design, knowledge or lack of innocent purpose.479 But it
has recently been held reversible error to present evidence as to
4 6 7 Workin v. United States, 260 Fed. 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1919).
468 Paris v. United States, 260 Fed. 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1919).
469 United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1945); Strader v.
United States, 72 F.2d 589, 591 (10th Cir. 1934); Harris v. United States,
273 Fed. 785, 791 (2d Cir. 1921); Dysart v. United States, 270 Fed. 77,
79 (5th Cir. 1921).
470 Manning v. United States, 287 Fed. 800, 805 (8th Cir. 1923).
47' Newman v. United States, 289 Fed. 712, 716 (4th Cir. 1923).
472 MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1935); Gart v.
United States, 294 Fed. 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1923).
473 Enriquez v. United States, 188 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1951), citing 2
WIGMORE, EViDENCE §§ 302, 303 (3d ed. 1940); Hood v. United States,
23 F.2d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 1927).
474 Gowling v. United States, 64 F.2d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1933).
475 Morris v. United States, 123 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1941) (cross-
examination).
476 Hubby v. United States, 150 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1945).
477Wright v. United States, 192 F.2d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 1951).
478United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1959).
479Medrano v. United States, 285 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1960).
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other narcotics offenses not set forth in the indictment even though
such other offenses occurred only a week later.480
E. Cnmnvs AGAINST THE STATE
1. Treason
In a prosecution for treason, it is not competent to prove that
the defendant in the course of the treasonous acts joined with
others in robbing the public mails, when there is already pending
a separate indictment against him for the latter offense and there
is no evidence that the mail was intercepted and rifled with a
traitorous intent.481
Where the overt act of treason has been proved by two wit-
nesses, it is proper to go into evidence to show the course of the
defendant's conduct at other places, and the purpose with which
he went to the place where the treason occurred; and if he went,
with a treasonable design, then the proof of treason is complete. 48 2
District Judge Peters, in his charge to the jury, stated that "evidence
may be given of other circumstances, or even of other overt acts,
connected with that on which the indictment is grounded, and oc-
curring or committed in any other part of the district than the one
mentioned.., to show the quo animo-the intent with which the
act laid was committed."48 3
Chief Justice Marshall held, in the trial of Aaron Burr, that acts
of treason elsewhere than charged are admissible since they "by
showing a general evil intention, render it more probable that the
intention in the particular case was evil. '48 4
2. Sedition
In a prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917, it was held
that the defendant's utterances of pro-German sentiments from
from 1915 to the date of the indictment should be admitted to show
intent.4 5 The defendant's contention that the statute did not re-
48 o Erwing v. United States, 296 F.2d 320, 323 (9th Cir. 1961).
4 8lUnited States v. Mitchell, 26 Fed. Cas. 1282 (No. 15789) (C.C.D. Pa.
1795).
482 Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 914 (No. 5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (such
an instruction to the pettit jury given by Circuit Justice Iredell).
483 Id. at 909.
484 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 52, 54 (No. 14692h) (C.C.D. Va.
1807).
485 United States v. Schulze, 253 Fed. 377, 381 (S.D. Cal. 1918), citing 1 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 367 (1st ed. 1904). See also Dierkes v. United States,
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quire intent was rejected. In a prosecution for obstructing the re-
cruiting service, threats that "he would like to shoot the President"
were excluded as the offense was distinct.486 Prosecuted for pub-
lishing a circular opposing military service, the defendant's con-
versations expressing similar opinions were admitted to show
intent.48 7 A resolution introduced by the defendant after the pas-
sage of the Selective Service Act was admitted to show his "at-
titude of mind towards the Conscription Act. '48 8 Statements made
at other times and places "not too remote" are admissible to show
intent.48 9 It made no difference that another indictment was pend-
ing as to these other statements. Other similar statements "made
at near-by times and places" were admitted to show intent and also
to show the actual utterance of the words charged.490 But another
case excluded other similar acts to show "whether it happened or
did not happen." 491 Certain letters and documents written by one
of the defendants similar to those mentioned in the indictment
were admitted against one in a prosecution for conspiracy to cause
insubordination and disloyalty.492
274 Fed. 75, 81 (6th Cir. 1921) ; Boehner v. United States, 267 Fed. 562, 563,(8th Cir. 1920); Albers v. United States, 263 Fed. 27, 31 (9th Cir. 1920);
Bold v. United States, 265 Fed. 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1920); Howenstine v.
United States, 263 Fed. 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1920); Equi v. United States, 261 Fed.
53, 56 (9th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 560 (1920); Shidler v. United
States, 263 Fed. 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1920); Equi v. United States, 261 Fed. 53,
56 (9th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 560 (1920); Shidler v. United
States, 257 Fed. 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1919); Coldwell v. United States,
256 Fed. 805, 811 (1st Cir. 1919); Rhuberg v. United States, 255 Fed.
865, 867 (9th Cir. 1919); Kirchner v. United States, 255 Fed. 301, 304 (4th
Cir. 1918); Deason v. United States, 254 Fed. 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1918).
Contra, Kammann v. United States, 259 Fed. 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1919);
Wolf v. United States, 259 Fed. 388, 393 (8th Cir. 1919).
486 Hall v. United States, 256 Fed. 748, 749 (4th Cir. 1919).
487Herman v. United States, 257 Fed. 601, 603 (9th Cir. 1919). See also
American Socialist Soc'y v. United States, 266 Fed. 212, 214 (2d Cir.
1920); Anderson v. United States, 264 Fed. 75, 77 (8th Cir. 1920), cert.
denied, 253 U.S. 495 (1920); Lockhart v. United States, 264 Fed. 14, 17
(6th Cir. 1920); Wimmer v. United States, 264 Fed. 11, 13 (6th Cir.
1920); Seebach v. United States, 262 Fed. 885, 887 (8th Cir. 1919); Par-
tan v. United States, 261 Fed. 515, 517 (9th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 251
U.S. 561 (1920).
488 Wells v. United States, 257 Fed. 605, 614 (9th Cir. 1919).
489 White v. United States, 263 Fed. 17, 20 (6th Cir. 1920).
490 Schoborg v. United States, 264 Fed. 1, 7 (6th Cir. 1920).
491 Holzmacher v. United States, 266 Fed. 979, 981 (7th Cir. 1920). Compare
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304 (3d ed. 1940).
492 United States v. Gordon, 138 F.2d 174, 176 (7th Cir. 1943).
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The defendants should have the right to offer his other ut-
terances and acts to show his loyal intent.493 Where the defendant's
possession of the German Kaiser's portrait was shown by the Gov-
ernment, questions were permitted as to whether he had kind feel-
ings to the Kaiser and whether he had an intent to foster sentiment
in favor of Germany.494 But in one case, the defendants' statements
prior to and during the war "evidencing their opposition to Ger-
many and the German cause and their partiotism towards the
United States" were excluded.495
F. CONSPIRAcY
Prior overt acts not charged in the indictment were admitted
in a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud by collusive bids.49
The government has considerable leeway in offering evidence
of other offenses in conspiracy prosecutions. In a prosecution for
conspiracy to violate the prohibition and tariff laws, evidence of
attempted bribery of an officer is admissible as part of the arrange-
ments to carry out the conspiracy.497 In a major conspiracy prosecu-
tion, evidence is admissible although it also tends to show a minor
conspiracy not charged in the indictment.498
In an antitrust prosecution, evidence that in a number of in-
stances over several years preceding the indictment the defendant
induced several hospitals to exclude physicians from their staffs
because of their connection with low cost plans for medical ser-
vices was admitted to show intent.49 9 In a conspiracy prosecution
to violate the Public Utility Holding Company Act the court stated:
"It was permissible however, to prove the acts of the earlier dates.
They tended to prove the existence of the conspiracy and the intent
of the conspirators." 50 0 In a prosecution for conspiracy to obtain
money by the use of force, testimony as to what had occurred
during other strikes was admitted "to show that the scheme proved
successful as a part of the proof that there had been a scheme."50' 1
493 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 369, at 299 (3d ed. 1940).
494 Erhardt v. United States, 268 Fed. 326, 328 (7th Cir. 1920).
495 Howenstine v. United States, 263 Fed. 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1920).
496 Houston v. United States, 217 Fed. 852, 858 (9th Cir. 1914).
497 Hogan v. United States, 48 F.2d 516, 518 (5th Cir. 1931).
498 Haffa v. United States, 36 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1929).
499 American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 250 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
500 Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 381 (8th Cir. 1943).
501 United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1944).
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Testimony as to the relationship of the companies prior to the
dissolution decree of 1911 was held admissible in a prosecution for
conspiracy to violate the Anti-Trust Act.50 2 But it seems improper
to go back three decades.
G. MIScELLANEOUS
1. Perjury
In a prosecution for perjury by falsely valuing imported goods,
thirty-five letters indicating a general design of the kind, covering
more than three years, were admitted as showing a false swearing
with intent to defraud.50 3 Acquisition of state school lands by sim-
ilar methods was admitted to show intent, purpose, design, or
knowledge in a prosecution for conspiracy to suborn perjury in
proceedings for the purchase of public lands.504
2. Bribery
In a prosecution for offering and giving a bribe to two pro-
hibition agents, it is reversible error to introduce evidence that on
an independent occasion he offered a bribe to a United States com-
missioner for accepting a bond for some unidentified person.50 5
Where there is no question of a prohibition officer's intent in taking
a bribe and the only question is whether or not he solicited and
took it, on which the testimony is in direct conflict, evidence of a
prior violation of the liquor law is irrelevant and inadmissible. 506
3. Arson
In a prosecuton for arson of a yacht for insurance in October,
1910, evidence of the burning of another yacht in October, 1909,
and of an automobile in September, 1910, under similar circum-
as to insurance was held reversible error.50 7
4. Miscellaneous Offenses
In a prosecution for keeping a house of ill-fame, the defendant's
previous conduct of houses of ill-fame was admitted to show guilty
knowledge.508
502 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 119 (6th Cir. 1944).
503United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430 (1840).
504 Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 451 (1908).
505 Cucchia v. United States, 17 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1927).
506 Crinnian v. United States, 1 F.2d 643, 645 (6th Cir. 1924). See, as to
conspiracy to accept bribes, Harvey v. United States, 23 F.2d 561, 563 (2d
Cir. 1928).
507 Fish v. United States, 215 Fed. 544, 551 (1st Cir. 1914).
508 De Four v. United States, 260 Fed. 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1919).
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Other fraudulent acts at the time were admitted in a prosecu-
tion for fraud by election inspectors in counting votes.50 9
The subsequent adultery of the defendant with the receiver
of the letter was held irrelevant in a prosecution for mailing lewd
letters.5 10 In a prosecution for unlawful destruction of salmon,
takings of salmon after the date charged was admitted to show
intent.511 In an abstruction of justice prosecution, another related
and inseparable offense was admitted.512 Charged with aiding and
abetting and counselling to evade the draft, defendants similar
transactions with another person were admitted. 513 In a prosecu-
tion for violating ration orders and maximum price regulations,
admissions of the defendant as to other similar offenses were ex-
cluded.514
VI. EXPERIMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
In a murder prosecution, it was held to be within the discretion
of the court to refuse a request of the defendant that a gun might
be shot off in the presence of a deputy marshal in order to test
how it threw the shot.515 In a prosecution for conspiracy to violate
the National Prohibition Act, in which a government witness testi-
fied to conversations heard on tapping telephone wires, refusal of
an application of the defendants to make an experimental test of
the witness' ability to identify voices heard over telephone was
held not erroneous, as being in the discretion of the trial judge.
The conditions would not be similar.5 16 In a trial for conspiracy
509 United States v. Pleva, 66 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1933).
51 0 Safter v. United States, 87 Fed. 329 (8th Cir. 1898).
511 Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. United States, 244 Fed. 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1917).
512 Astwood v. United States, 1 F.2d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 1924).
513 United States v. Bradley, 152 F.2d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 1945).
514 Kempe v. United States, 151 F.2d 680, 687 (8th Cir. 1945).
515 Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 673 (1896). See 2 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 457, at 468 (3d ed. 1940).
On experimental and scientific evidence, see 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE§§ 165(a), 165(b) (3d ed. 1940); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 441-60 (3d ed.
1940); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 997-99 (3d ed. 1940); McCoR icx, Evi-
DENC E 359-83 (1954); 2 WHARTON, CRnIMIAL EVIDENCE §§ 666-70, 682-83
(12th ed. 1955); 2 JONES, EVIDENCE §§ 455-57 (5th ed. 1958); 1 UNDERHILL,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 135-55 (5th ed. 1956); 2 UNDER ILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 517 (5th ed. 1956); 34 ILL. L. REV. 206 (1939); 9 N.C.L. REV.
453 (1931); Annot., 8 A.L.R.. 18 (1920); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 479 (1933).
516 Green v. United States, 19 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1927), affirmed without
discussion of the point, 277 U.S. 438 -(1928). See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 443, at 428 (3d ed. 1940); 34 ILL. L. REV. 206 (1939).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 3
to manufacture intoxicating liquor, tests of alcoholic contents may
be made by means of an ebulliometer, a method used throughout
the country in liquor cases, the accuracy of which has not been
challenged.517
A physician who had long experience as a medical examiner
could express his own opinion that a man had been killed with a .38
caliber bullet, although the experiment was conducted out of the
presence of the jury.518
Where the government conducts tests and experiments, there
seem to be no cases permitting the defendant to have discovery
before trial.519 On principle such discovery should be available. In
December, 1952, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the
Judicial Conference proposed to give the defendant discovery before
trial as to objects "which are within the possession, custody or con-
trol of the government, including . .. the results of or reports of
physical examinations and scientific tests, experiments and com-
parisons." Rule 16 would be amended to that effect. Under exist-
ing law in civil cases, notice to the adversary and opportunity to be
present are not required.520 But a federal court has contrasted, as
to reliability, experiments where such opportunity and notice is
given and where they are not.5 2 1 Perhaps notice should be required
and an impartial person be appointed to conduct the experiment.522
Fingerprints may be taken at the time of arrest even though no
authorization is given either by a federal or state statute. 23 Where
fingerprints are voluntarily taken of a person not yet arrested, a
517 Clift v. United States, 22 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1927).
518 United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849, 858 (D. Md. 1961). The court
cited MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE ch. 20 (1954).
519 Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59
W. VA. L. REV. 221, 250 (1957).
520 McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 169, at 362 (1954).
521 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Van Elderen, 137 Fed. 557, 570 (8th Cir. 1905).
See 34 ILL. L. REV. 206, 208 (1939); 60 YALE L. J. 626, 640 (1951).
5 22 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 169, at 362 (1954). For cases not requiring
notice see Goodall v. United States, 180 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 987 (1950), discussed in Annot., 17 A.L.R. 2d 1070(1951); Laney v. United States, 294 Fed. 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
523 United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v.
Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932) discussed in Annot., 83 A.L.R. 122
(1933). See 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 151(a) (3d ed. 1940); 2 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 414, 414(a) (3d ed. 1940); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265, at 387
(rev. ed. 1961); Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, Finger
Prints and Palm Prints, 25 J. Cnm. L., C. & P.S. 500, 514 (1934).
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motion to suppress will not lie.524 Footprints and the shoes of the
defendant may be introduced in evidence by the government. 525
There may be chemical analyses of poisons and narcotics. 52
There may be testimony as to ballistics. Expert testimony that the
bullet extracted from the decedent's head was shot from the pistol
found in the defendant's possession is admissible. 527 The science
of spectroscopy was used to determine that the particles of metal
contained in a fingernail file were from a bullet where it was
shown that the noses of the bullets and those found in the de-
fendant's possession had been similarly scraped.5 28
A federal district court has stated:529
[Use] of radar equipment in determining the speed of a motor
vehicle ... like the use of speedometers, cameras, and x-rays, has
now reached such general acceptance ... that its no longer neces-
sary for the prosecution to offer expert testimony ... to explain
the theory and operation of the radar equipment .... It is suf-
ficient to show that the equipment has been properly tested and
checked, that it was manned by a competent operator, that proper
operative procedures were followed, and that proper records were
kept."
In one of the Hiss trials, the judge held that psychiatric testi-
524 United States v. McCarthy, 297 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1961).
525 Downey v. United States, 263 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1959). On footprints
see 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 151(a) (3d ed. 1940); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§§ 415, 660 (3d ed. 1940); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 389 (rev. ed.
1961).
526W. B. Wood Mfg. Co. v. United States, 292 Fed. 133 (8th Cir. 1923);
Samuels v. United States, 232 Fed. 536, 542 (8th Cir. 1916).
527 Laney v. United States, 294 Fed. 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Goodall v.
United States, 180 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
987 (1950), discussed in Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1070 (1951).
528 Medley v. United States, 155 F.2d 857, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 873 (1946). See 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 354 (1946); Annot.,
66 A.L.R. 373 (1930); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 892 (1952); 2 WiGmoME,
EVIDENCE § 417 (a) (3d ed. 1940); Conrad, Evidential Implications of the
Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder Residues, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 500
(1961).
529 United States v. Dreox, 156 F. Supp. 200, 208 (D. Md. 1957). The court
cited Kopper, Symposium: Radar Speedometers, 16 MD. L. REV. 1, 17
(1956); 33 N.C.L. REV. 343 (1955). See also 30 N.C.L. REV. 385 (1952).
See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 363 (1954); 2 WHARTON, CRImINAL EVIDENCE
597-99 (12th ed. 1955); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 417(b), 665(a) (3d
ed. 1940); 23 TENN. L. REV. 784 (1955).
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mony was admissible to impeach the credibility of the govern-
ment's key witness.5 30
The subject of handwriting and questioned documents has been
dealt with by the author in a separate discussion of the Opinion
Rule.
When faced with the question of the admissibility of the re-
sults of a lie detector examination, the first American case on the
problem announced the determinative test to be whether the sup-
porting theory had gained "general acceptance" among "physi-
ological and psychological authorities." 531 The court held that the
test was not met, and rejected the evidence. When the defendant
selects his own examiner and without any agreement with the
government, submits to the test, and offers the result in evidence,
it will be excluded.532 A defendant charged with indecent assault
cannot compel the complaining witness to undergo a lie detector
test.5
33
A policeman was permitted to testify that the defendant was
told that the lie detector indicated that he was lying.5 34 The de-
fendant had confessed after taking a polygraph test. The testimony
was admissible to prove that the defendant's confession was vol-
untary. But it was not receivable to show that the defendant was
lying. Possibly the decision should be extended to using such evi-
dence to impeach or rehabilitate witnesses.5 35 In a civil action the
trial court admitted the results of the lie detector test for the
limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of the insured
claimant. 36
530United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The court
cited 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 924(a), 931, 932, 935, 997(b), 998(b) (3d
ed. 1940); see also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 106, 401, 409 (1942).
53'Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); noted ap-
provingly 24 COLum. L. REV. 429 (1924), 37 HARv. L. REV. 1138 (1925), 33
YALE L.J. 771 (1924). But see McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 170, 174 (1954);
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 999 (3d ed. 1940); 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2265, at
400 (rev. ed. 1961). Compare Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L. J. 694 (1961). See
Newsweek, April 29, 1963, pp. 82-83.
532See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 174, at 370-71 (1954).
5 3 Larkin v. United States, 144 A.2d 100, 104 (D.C. Munic. Ct. of App.
1958).
534 Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 908 (1952).
535 24 GA. B.J. 286, 291 (1961).
536 California Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1956), citing
many writings.
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Where a witness testified that the defendant first agreed to
take a lie detector test, but later refused, the trial judge in sustain-
ing objection to part of the answer on the grounds that there was a
difference of opinion as to the scientific validity of such a test,
did not create any unfavorable inference.537 A new trial was denied
for newly discovered evidence when the defendant submitted the
results of a lie detector test.538 Evidence of the defendant as to the
result of a lie detector test was excluded in a prosecution for
bribery.539 Under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure a remark by the United States Attorney in cross-examination
of a defendant as to the defendant's offer to take a lie-detector test
that he "would not give a nickel for a dozen of them," while not
commendable, was not reversible error.5 40
In 1962, the Supreme Court of Utah held, subject to specified
qualifications, thiat a lie detector test is admissible on stipulation.54'
In one case, the prosecutrix in a statutory rape case was im-
peached by letters admitting that her accusations were false. For
the sole purpose of rehabilitating the witness, the government intro-
duced a recording of her subsequent interview with a psychiatrist
wihle she was under the influence of sodium-pentothal. The court
of appeals reversed. 42The court cited an article,543 prepared jointly
by two Yale Law School and two Yale Medical School professors,
concluding that narcoanalysis is by no means an infallible tool nor
should it be regarded by psychiatrists as truth. The court held it
537United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833, 841 (2d Cir. 1957). See also
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bros., 289 F.2d 30, 34 (8th Cir. 1961), noted
24 GA. B.J. 286 (1961).
538 United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The
court cited 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 999 (3d ed. 1940).
539 Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 929 (1959). See Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the
"Lie Detector," 10 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 50 (1958).
540 Horton v. United States, 256 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1958).
541 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962), noted 15 ALA. L. REV.
248 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 5 ARiz. L. REV. 76. Many cases and
writings are cited. See Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the
"Lie Detector;" 10 HASTINGS L. J. 47, 49 (1958).
542 Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956), noted 23 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 316 (1957); 46 Ky. L. J. 165 (1957); 35 TExAS. L. REV. 600 (1957);
1957 U. ILL. L.F. 138. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 175 (1954); 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 998, 999 (3d ed. 1940); 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE: § 2265, at 400
(rev. ed. 1961).
543 Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced ReveZation, 62
YALE L.J. 315, 319 (1953).
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unnecessary to determine whether the expert could testify that
in his opinion the victim's testimony was true and accurate or
to the test results as the basis of his opnion. It was prejudicial
error to refer several times, at the trial, to the drug as "truth
serum." A tape-recording of the narcoanalysis was not admis-
sible either. Here the prior consistent statement was not made
at the time when the witness had no motive to fabricate. Due
process of law was violated.544 Likewise responses to questions ob-
tained from the defendant while he is asleep are not admissible.545
In 1963, the Supreme Court held that a state court confession in-
duced by drugs is inadmissible.546
In a prosecution for manslaughter from operation of an auto-
mobile in which it was claimed that the defendant was intoxicated,
the defendant after arrest complied with a direction to furnish a
urine specimen. His subsequent motion to suppress was denied.
Judge Holtzoff stated: "The privilege against self-incrimination
is limited to the giving of oral testimony. ' 547 In 1957, the Supreme
Court upheld a state court conviction based on blood removed from
the defendant while unconscious. 548
A court has stated that Congress can pass legislation providing
for the use of chemical analysis to determine alcohol in blood.
Congress may549
[ciarve out a new exception to the hearsay rule, without violating
constitutional rights, where there is reasonable necessity for it and
where it is supported by an adequate basis for assurance that the
evidence has those qualities of reliability and trustworthiness at-
tributed to other evidence admissible under long established ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule.
In a prosecution for murder, it is competent to show by blood
544 As to due process, see Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal
Cases, 69 HARV. L. REV. 683 (1956).
545 Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955), noted 34 TEXAS
L. REV. 472 (1956).
54GTownsend v. Sain, 272 U.S. 293 (1963). See MacDonald, Truth Serum,
46 J. CRim. L. (Eng.) 259 (1955).
547 United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758, 762 (D.D.C. 1954), noted
4 J. PUB. L. 202 (1955). See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE oF GUILT 28 n.18 (1959).
54 8Breiethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (three dissents). Noted 71
HARv. L. REV. 94, 161 (1957); 42 MINN. L. REV. 662 (1958); 35 TEXAS L.
REV. 813 (1957); 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 315; 11 VAND. L. REV. 196 (1957).
549 Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 825 (1958), noted 4 VLL. L. REV. 448 (1959); 16 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 62 (1959). See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 176 (1954); 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2265 (rev. ed. 1961).
RELEVANCY IN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
tests that the victim's blood was type A while the defendants blood
was type 0 and that fresh blood spots of both types were found on
the defendant's clothing shortly after the fatal shooting of the
victim.55 0
VII. CONCLUSION
No general enveloping summation is possible on the subject
of relevancy of evidence. As this article has attempted to indicate,
it is the facts, not the general rules, which must be examined and
weighed. The cases presented here are not intended to be ex-
haustive but rather indicative of the growth and development in
this area and illustrative of the viewpoints pertinent to relevancy
of federal criminal evidence.
550 Kemp v. Government of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938, 939 (5th Cir. 1948).
See 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 165 (a), 165 (b) (3d ed. 1940); McCoRMIcK,
EVIDENCE 377-83 (1954). See also People v. Tashman, 233 N.Y.S.2d 744
(1962), noted 23 MD. L. REV. 286 (1963); Commonwealth v. Statti, 166
Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950), noted 13 GA. B.J. 253, 19 J.B.A. Kan.
271; 3 S.C.L.Q. 176; 14 U. Det. L.J. 37; 12 U. PITT. L. REV. 122; Shanks v.
State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945); Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826,
197 So. 562 (1940); State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933),
noted 20 CORNELL L.Q. 232 (1935); 19 IowA L. REV. 625 (1934); 32 MICH.
L. REV. 987 (1934); 82 U. PA. L. REV. 654 (1934); 43 YALE L.J. 651 (1934);
aff'd on rehearing, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936), noted 21 MINN. L.
REV. 602 (1937); 9 Mss. L. J. 234 (1936).
